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JURISDICTIONAL FACT
Kevin M. Clermont†
What kind of factual showing must the plaintiff make in order to estab-
lish, say, personal jurisdiction?  While that question may seem simple
enough, real difficulties in regard to the standard of proof arise when there is
a similarity of the facts entailed in the jurisdictional determination and those
on the merits.  Surely, the plaintiff has to do more than allege that the
defendant is the author of state-directed acts or omissions.  Yet, almost as
surely, the plaintiff should not have to prove the cause of action in order to
establish jurisdiction.  The plaintiff thus must have to show something be-
tween allegation and proof.
From a morass of confused cases on this procedural point of signifi-
cance, this Article draws a startlingly clear rule that covers jurisdictional
fact, and much more.  On any factual element or legal question of forum
authority, from subject-matter jurisdiction to venue whenever properly chal-
lenged, the proponent of forum authority must make the usual showing of
“more likely than not,” subject to this exception: if that element or question
overlaps the merits of the claim, the proponent need provide only prima facie
proof to establish the forum’s authority. Depending on the particular thresh-
old issue’s importance, “prima facie” might mean any of the standards below
the more-likely-than-not standard, namely, slightest possibility, reasonable
possibility, substantial possibility, or equipoise.  That lower standard will
allow the judge to decide efficiently but definitively whether the forum has
authority to decide the merits—doing so without entailing or foreclosing any
decision on the merits, a decision to which a higher standard would apply.
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INTRODUCTION
Facts are facts.  So, what kind of factual showing must the plaintiff
make in order to establish, say, personal jurisdiction in a civil case?
Well, proof of such jurisdictional facts would appear to be an ordinary
task, subject to the ordinary standard of proof.1  The ordinary stan-
dard of proof—our default rule—is preponderance of the evidence,
because it serves the neutral policy of error-minimization.2  In theory,
then, to prove an issue of jurisdictional fact, the plaintiff must present
a preponderance of the evidence.3  If that is so, then why inflict an
article on the subject?  The reason is that real difficulties with regard
to the standard of proof arise whenever a jurisdictional determination
entails similar facts as those on the merits determination.
Imagine, for example, that for jurisdiction, the plaintiff alleges
commission of an in-state tort by the defendant.  In that and many
other important situations, it would seem that if—and often, only if—
the plaintiff has a winning cause of action will there be jurisdiction.
Here, however, what “appears” or “seems” simply cannot be, as a mo-
ment’s thought convinces.  Instead, the question of determining the
applicable standard of proof when jurisdiction and merits overlap be-
comes a tough call, ultimately turning on obscure authority.
1 This is not to suggest that the preponderance standard lacks its own many myster-
ies and problems. See Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three: Psychological
Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1118–21 (1987) [hereinafter Cler-
mont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three]; cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Compara-
tive View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (2002) (comparative study focusing on
France); Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States, 37 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 263 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan] (comparative study
focusing on Japan).  Likewise, there are questions aplenty as to how any standard of proof
actually works in practice. See, e.g., infra notes 125 & 127. R
2 See Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan, supra note 1, at 270–71; infra text accompa- R
nying note 114. R
3 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 831–32 (5th Cir.
1986), modified on other grounds, 836 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1988); Farmer Boys’ Catfish Kitchens
Int’l, Inc. v. Golden W. Wholesale Meats, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (E.D. Tex. 1998);
New Eng. Welding Contractors, Inc. v. Hydra-Machinery Sales, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 315, 315
(D. Mass. 1989); 2 ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS
§ 6-1[3][b], at 10–11 & n.21 (3d ed. 1998).
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In answering that question, this Article will show that facts are not
always simply facts.  Jurisdictional facts are sui generis, a unique breed
deserving procedural treatment different from that given the merits’
facts.  Just as jurisdictional issues generate their own branch of res
judicata, the one that goes by the name of “jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction,”4 they deserve and get their own standard of proof.  Spe-
cifically, if any factual (or legal) issue that a court must determine in
ascertaining the authority of the forum (whether as a matter of juris-
diction, service, or venue) overlaps the merits, a lower standard of
proof prevails for jurisdictional purposes, but not for merits purposes.
Initially, this realization—that these threshold issues fundamen-
tally differ from what look to be identical issues on the merits, and so
require different procedures—complicates the law.  But ultimately, as
I shall try to show, this recognition can work to resolve some of the
law’s classically difficult puzzlements, including ones concerning jury
right, res judicata, and collateral attack.
A specific example is indispensable for exposing the problem and
suggesting its solution.  Consider a set of facts chosen not for its sauci-
ness, but for its power to bare the difficulties.  Assume that a woman
brings a paternity suit at home in Illinois against an absent man on
allegations of in-state impregnation, and that the defendant from
Ohio denies the factual allegations.  More particularly, Shirley of Illi-
nois has brought a paternity action against Jim of Ohio in an Illinois
state court.  She claims, in essence, that he sired her child out of wed-
lock and has failed in his duty to provide support.  She alleges, “Dur-
ing the time biologically certain to have been the instant of
conception, your Plaintiff had sexual intercourse with your Defendant
in Cook County, Illinois, and with no other person.”  She mentions no
other connection of Jim to Illinois.  He has received in-hand service of
process in Ohio pursuant to the Illinois long-arm statute.  Further im-
agine that the defendant denies that he was “the author of acts or
omissions within the state.”  The defendant says that he attended a big
and wild traveling party that began in Gary, Indiana, but in his foggy
recollection, he does not think that he ever met the plaintiff or had
sex with anyone.  He has now, by his attorney, submitted a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and his papers in support
spell out his denial of the complaint’s allegations.  The defendant’s
challenge is not to the state’s constitutional or statutory reach, but
rather to the plaintiff’s factual allegations.5
4 See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 4.4(B)(2)–(3),
5.1(A)(1)–(3) (2005) (distinguishing this doctrine from claim and issue preclusion).
5 Although there is no constitutional problem on these facts, see, e.g., Gentry v. Davis,
512 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tenn. 1974), courts have differed on whether their state’s long-arm stat-
ute extends to this situation. Compare Poindexter v. Willis, 231 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. App. Ct.
1967) (finding jurisdiction under the Illinois statute’s provision for “commission of a tor-
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Surely, Jim’s denial cannot suffice to defeat personal jurisdiction,
because that result would effectively repeal the long-arm statute.  Just
as surely, Shirley must do more than allege that the defendant is the
author of in-state acts or omissions, because that standard would obvi-
ously have all sorts of illogical consequences.6  After all, we would
probably want to allow a defaulting defendant to raise, say, mistaken
identity as a jurisdictional defense when seeking relief from judg-
ment.7  If not, we would have created a worldwide service provision,
requiring only the plaintiff’s say-so to force the defendant to appear.
It is thus clear that this court must actually determine whether
jurisdiction exists.  What showing, then, must the plaintiff make to es-
tablish challenged jurisdiction?  She should not have to prove her
cause of action in order to establish jurisdiction, because that stan-
dard would likewise have all sorts of obviously illogical consequences.8
tious act within this State”), enforced, 256 N.E.2d 254 (Ohio C.P. Montgomery County
1970), with Anonymous v. Anonymous, 268 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Fam. Ct. 1966) (finding no juris-
diction under a similar New York statute), discussed in verse, David D. Siegel, Case & Com-
ment, in Vagrant Verse, CASE & COMMENT, Sept.–Oct. 1971, at 56, 63. See generally James O.
Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Long-Arm Statutes: Obtaining Jurisdiction over Nonresident Parent in
Filiation or Support Proceeding, 76 A.L.R.3d 708 (1977) (discussing the division among cases
on the issue).  Note that today, more than half the states’ statutes would reach specifically
this kind of case, including the special provision that New York enacted in 1997 as N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 580-201(6) (McKinney 2005) (“the individual engaged in sexual inter-
course in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse”) to
change the Anonymous case’s result. See 1 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 4-2[2][a][i], at R
442 n.227, [7]; 2 id. § 9-2[6].  Indeed, Illinois today has a similarly specific long-arm stat-
ute, but one that also contains a catch-all provision that reaches to the limits of due pro-
cess. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-209 (2005) (containing the somewhat redundant
clauses (a)(6) and (a)(8) derived from separate but simultaneous bills). See generally Keith
H. Beyler, The Illinois Long Arm Statute: Background, Meaning, and Needed Repairs, 12 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 293 (1988).
Note also that analogous cases arise in connection with “tortious dumping” of chil-
dren. See Gary N. Skoloff, Stretching the Long-Arm Statute in Support of “Dumped” Children,
NAT’L L.J., July 1, 1985, at 21.
6 Even so, there is some case support for the position that mere allegations do suf-
fice. See, e.g., Schermerhorn v. Hoiland, 337 N.W.2d 692, 693–94 (Minn. 1983) (“In other
words, at this juncture, we take as true that defendant Raymond Johnson was a co-owner of
the plane with defendant Loren Nogosek, who at relevant times was a Minnesota resident,
and that the negotiations for the sale of the airplane to Minnesota plaintiffs were initiated
by defendant Johnson’s co-owner in Minnesota. . . .  Here the plaintiffs have alleged facts
that, if true, show that defendant Johnson purposely availed himself, through his co-owner,
of the privilege of conducting activities within Minnesota.”).  Indeed, in this confused area,
one can find case support for just about any position.
7 See Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 2002) (deciding to allow at-
tack, while observing: “To prove that the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, Fratelli Tanfoglio raises an assertedly meritorious defense (identity of the pistol’s
manufacturer) that the district court’s default judgment on the merits had flatly rejected.
Because the identity of the pistol’s manufacturer has ramifications for both jurisdiction
and the merits, the ‘foundational principle’ embodied in Rule 60(b)(4) collides head-on
with a well-established rule of claim preclusion.”).
8 Even so, there is some case support for this position. See, e.g., H.V. Allen Co. v.
Quip-Matic, Inc., 266 S.E.2d 768, 769 (N.C. Ct. App.) (2-1 decision) (“The only possible
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A preliminary hearing on jurisdiction would entail a full-dress trial on
the merits as to all issues of liability, with troublesome judge/jury
problems and difficult res judicata or law-of-the-case implications.9  If
the defendant won that hearing, he would get not a conclusive judg-
ment on the merits but only a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction; and
meanwhile, he would have relinquished his right not to have to liti-
gate the merits in that forum.10  If he instead defaulted, he could
force a trial on all the issues of liability in his home state because these
would be jurisdictional facts subject to collateral attack; and thus the
statutory objective of forcing the defendant, when appropriate, to de-
fend his conduct in the state where it took place would be nullified.11
The answer, therefore, must lie in requiring the plaintiff to show
the court something between mere allegation and full proof.  This Ar-
ticle, in Part I, will develop the simple answer in the exemplary con-
text of personal-jurisdictional fact.  Then, in Part II, it will show that
this answer broadly applies to all factual and legal questions of forum
authority, from venue to subject-matter jurisdiction.
subsection which might apply in the instant case is subsection (1)[: ‘any cause of action
arising . . . [o]ut of any contract made in this State or to be performed in this State’].  Yet
the record fails to show that a contract was ever made in North Carolina between plaintiff
and defendant.  Plaintiff certainly alleged that a binding contract was entered into, but
defendant vigorously denied any contract.  It cannot be conclusively stated that a contract
was made at all, and therefore this subsection is inapplicable.”), appeal dismissed, 273 S.E.2d
298 (N.C. 1980).
9 See N. Am. Video Corp. v. Leon, 480 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Mass. 1979) (“If the
[preponderance] course were undertaken, the court might be deciding key fact issues that,
if the doctrine of estoppel were not applied, would be resubmitted for jury determination
at trial, thus making wasteful use of scarce judicial resources and also creating a possibility
of inconsistent findings by the court on motion and the jury at trial. If estoppel were ap-
plied on the basis of the court’s resolution of the issues, thereby precluding waste and
inconsistency, then either the court must impanel a jury just to try those issues for disposi-
tion of the motion—a dubious procedure at best—or else the parties would effectively be
denied jury trial on those issues because the court’s findings on them when determining
the motion would preclude their resubmission at jury trial.”).  For explanation and resolu-
tion of these problems, see infra text accompanying notes 63–67 (jury problems) and notes R
68–72 (preclusion problems). R
10 See, e.g., H.V. Allen Co., 266 S.E.2d at 769, 772 (reversing the lower court’s decision
for the defendant on the merits and dismissing on jurisdictional grounds).
11 Again, these dread consequences are not fanciful, as confused courts sometimes do
allow lowly merits to be litigated under the guise of a collateral attack for lack of personal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pardo v. Wilson Line of Wash., Inc., 414 F.2d 1145, 1149–50 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (allowing defendants who had defaulted to prove there had been no fraudulent
transfer within the long-arm statute); cf. Temtex Prods., Inc. v. Brock, 433 So. 2d 942, 944
(Miss. 1983) (allowing defendant who had defaulted to prove that she had not signed a
contract within the long-arm statute, without discussing standard of proof).
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I
SIMPLICITY OF THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR PERSONAL-
JURISDICTIONAL FACT
Apparently, the case law’s solution is to require the plaintiff,
upon challenge, to make a “prima facie” showing on jurisdictional
facts that overlap the merits.12  Courts apply the prima facie standard
either to deny jurisdiction or to uphold it.13
Lots of cases throw around this term and idea of prima facie
proof of jurisdiction.14  But few judges bother to define prima facie.
This traditionally vague phrase requires the plaintiff to establish a
“non-trivial possibility” that the jurisdictional facts exist and that there-
fore the alleged scenario took place.15  So, it is clear that prima facie
12 See, e.g., Institutional Food Mktg. Assocs. v. Golden State Strawberries, Inc., 747
F.2d 448, 455 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming pretrial dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and ob-
serving: “FMA and FSS have failed to make a prima facie showing of an essential element of
tortious interference with a contract: ‘absence of justification.’”); Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d
276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming pretrial dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and observing
that plaintiff “need not, however, establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence; prima facie evidence of personal jurisdiction is sufficient”), reh’g denied with opin-
ion, 712 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1983); Prod. Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491
(5th Cir. 1974) (affirming pretrial dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and observing that “the
task required only a prima facie showing of the facts on which jurisdiction was predi-
cated”); Block Indus. v. DHJ Indus., 495 F.2d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1974) (affirming pretrial
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and observing: “Although a plaintiff seeking to predicate
long-arm jurisdiction on the accrual of a tort action within the forum state need not make
a full showing on the merits that the nonresident defendant committed the tort, a prima
facie showing is required to defeat a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.”); 4
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.6,
at 538 n.5, 559 n.13 (3d ed. 2002) (collecting cases that require prima facie showing); 5B
id. § 1351, at 274–99 (3d ed. 2004).
13 The cases cited supra note 12 all involved easy dismissal for jurisdiction clearly lack- R
ing, but many cases uphold jurisdiction upon a prima facie showing. See, e.g., New York ex
rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue Nat’l, 69 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (upholding
jurisdiction on pretrial motion, under prima facie standard); Walker v. Univ. Books, Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 126, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (same); United Barge Co. v. Logan Charter Serv.,
Inc., 237 F. Supp. 624, 631 (D. Minn. 1964) (same); cf. infra note 79 (citing cases that apply R
prima facie only at pretrial).
14 Commentators too invoke the prima facie standard for jurisdiction. See, e.g., 4
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068, at
250 (1st ed. 1969) (making the point in a single sentence: “To avoid precipitating too
extensive an investigation of the merits at this stage of the litigation, only a prima facie
showing is required on a jurisdiction motion.”—which was carried over to id. at 345 (2d ed.
1987) but omitted in the current edition, when revisers perhaps lost sight of the point’s
significance).
15 See United Barge Co., 237 F. Supp. at 631 (upholding jurisdiction on pretrial motion,
and observing: “The acts which are relied on to give the Court jurisdiction need only have
raised a non-trivial possibility that the defendant will be found to have committed a tort.
Otherwise the statute would face serious objections under the due process clause.”).
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requires less of a showing than that required by the normally prevail-
ing standard of proof,16 but it is unclear how much less.17
Few judges face the need to trace the implications of their state-
ments about a prima facie standard.  The reason would seem to be
that its application comes most often upon pretrial determination,
when the judges can invoke the frequently quoted prima facie stan-
dard without much thought or discussion.  If the plaintiff fails to meet
that low standard, dismissal is usually the easy result.  If the case sur-
vives dismissal and goes to trial, the defendant who can defeat the case
on the merits no longer pushes the jurisdictional point, because the
defendant prefers a victory on the merits to a jurisdictional dismissal.
In the rarer scenario of a defaulting defendant who later seeks relief
from judgment, the reported cases seem not to focus on the applica-
ble standard of proof, concentrating instead on the possibly shifting
burden of proof.18
Thus, few courts need openly to maintain that even after pretrial,
the standard of proof for jurisdiction remains low—or at least it is true
that few courts do so.  Yet precisely this constancy of the lower stan-
dard, from a case’s beginning to its end, is the telling feature of prima
facie proof in this context: Whenever a critical jurisdictional fact over-
laps the merits, the prima facie standard should remain the standard
of proof of that fact for jurisdictional purposes throughout the pro-
ceedings.  As this Article will develop, the prima facie standard should
prevail even on a challenge at or after trial.  If the plaintiff can make
that lowered showing, then jurisdiction exists.  If the plaintiff fails to
16 See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. ____, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2413–14, 2416 (2005)
(holding that a prima facie showing of a violation under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), requires less than “more likely than not”).
17 In describing judge-jury relations, “prima facie” may refer to either a permissible
inference or a mandatory presumption. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).  In describing a standard of proof, “prima facie” becomes even
more flexible. See In re Williams, 330 F.3d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 2003) (“At the outset, we
consider the meaning of the statutory term ‘prima facie showing.’  Other courts of appeals
differ over whether this is an exacting requirement or a relatively lenient one. Compare,
e.g., Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F.3d 270, 273 (1st Cir. 1998) (characterizing the
prima facie showing as ‘a high hurdle’), with, e.g., Bell v. United States, 296 F.3d 127, 128
(2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (stating that [this habeas corpus statute] does ‘not [establish]
a particularly high standard’).”); Laser Indus. v. Reliant Techs., 167 F.R.D. 417, 425 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (discussing the showing required for crime/fraud exception to attorney-client
privilege and saying that “the phrase ‘prima facie showing’ or ‘prima facie case’ can mean
different things in different environments—and courts must take care not to answer the
difficult question we address in this section on the basis of circular reasoning that is driven
by a definition of ‘prima facie’ that was developed in other settings to serve other pur-
poses”), appeal dismissed, 232 F.3d 910 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
18 See infra note 53. R
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show the related factual element by a preponderance at trial, then the
plaintiff will lose, but lose on the merits.19
A. The Two Leading Cases on Prima Facie Proof of
Jurisdictional Fact That Overlaps Merits
One of the most famous pioneering state court long-arm deci-
sions perceived the problem of standard of proof and very intelli-
gently discussed it. Nelson v. Miller upheld the new Illinois
jurisdictional statute in an action for personal injury from alleged neg-
ligence in unloading a truck in Illinois, during delivery of a stove by
the Wisconsin defendant’s employee.20  In reversing a successful spe-
cial appearance, the Illinois Supreme Court said sweepingly that the
entire statute reflected “a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process
clause.”21
Significantly, the defendant in Nelson contended that jurisdiction
under the statutory words “commission of a tortious act within this
State”22 depended upon proof of all the elements necessary to spell
out ultimate liability in tort.23  The court rejected this contention,
holding that the jurisdictional requirement was met “when the defen-
dant, personally or through an agent, is the author of acts or omis-
19 See 2 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 6-1[3][c], at 14–15 (giving by far the best R
discussion of the problem, but doing so in one paragraph and citing only one case: “When
the issue upon which jurisdiction depends is also an issue going to the substantive merits,
the best approach might be to adopt as the standard of proof on the jurisdiction questions
some measure such as ‘reasonable likelihood,’ or some similar measure short of absolute
proof.  Such a standard could be applied once and for all at the threshold of the action
without an extensive factual inquiry.  Satisfaction of that standard would mean that the
defendant is subject to jurisdiction.  The issue would not be held in abeyance pending
trial.  This approach would avoid the anomaly of a possible dismissal for want of jurisdic-
tion—a judgment not on the merits—after the merits have been fully litigated.  The
threshold standard would have to be demanding enough to protect substantially the defen-
dant’s right not to have to defend in that forum if the conditions warranting jurisdiction
do not exist.  This is the way the problem was resolved by the federal court in Massachu-
setts.  In that case, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss at the outset of
the action, finding that the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of fraud sufficient to
bring the defendant under the long-arm statute.  At trial, the jury found that no fraud had
been committed, but found for the plaintiff on a contract count.  The defendant’s claim
that the action should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction was denied.  The court’s earlier
ruling was final on the jurisdiction question.” (citing Val Leasing, Inc. v. Hutson, 674 F.
Supp. 53 (D. Mass. 1987)); see also 1 id. § 4-2[2][a][iii] (discussing related points); cf. Adolf
Homburger, The Reach of New York’s Long-Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, 15 BUFF. L. REV.
61, 84–87 (1965) (recognizing the possibility of a lower standard of proof). But see John E.
Amerman, Recent Decision, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 273 (1966) (criticizing United States v.
Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1966), a case that applied the prima facie
standard).
20 143 N.E.2d 673, 675, 682 (Ill. 1957) (Schaefer, J.).
21 Id. at 679.
22 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-209(a)(2) (2005).
23 See 143 N.E.2d at 680.
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sions within the State, and when the complaint states a cause of action
in tort arising from such conduct.”24  The court explained:
The word “tortious” can, of course, be used to describe conduct that
subjects the actor to tort liability. . . .  It does not follow, however,
that the word must have that meaning in a statute that is concerned
with jurisdictional limits.  To so hold would be to make the jurisdic-
tion of the court depend upon the outcome of a trial on the merits.
There is no indication that the General Assembly intended a result
so unusual.  The essential question in cases of this type is where the
action is to be tried.  Once it has been determined that the relation-
ship of the defendant to the State is sufficient to warrant trial here,
we are of the opinion that the court has jurisdiction to determine
the merits of the controversy, and that its jurisdiction will not be
destroyed by its exercise.25
The Nelson court further explained that the rejected construction
of the statute “would produce anomalous results.”26  First, a prelimi-
nary hearing on jurisdiction would entail a full-dress trial on the mer-
its as to all issues of liability; and thus the system would incur waste:
And if, upon that preliminary hearing the court should find liability
for jurisdictional purposes, it would nevertheless be necessary to re-
try all the issues relating to liability in order to determine the merits
of the case, because “No determination of any issue of fact in con-
nection with the objection [to jurisdiction] is a determination of the
merits of the case or any aspect thereof.” Civil Practice Act, sec.
20(2); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap. 110, par. 20.27
Second, if the defendant won on his special appearance, he would get
not a judgment on the merits but only a dismissal for lack of jurisdic-
tion; and thus the defendant would suffer disadvantage:
A dismissal for want of jurisdiction, after a finding on the prelimi-
nary hearing that liability in tort had not been established, might
not protect the nonresident defendant from a subsequent suit on
the same cause of action in his home State, because under section
20(2) the judgment of dismissal will not determine the merits.  Cf.
Restatement, Judgments, § 49 [“Judgment For Defendant Not On
The Merits”].  Thus the defendant who successfully litigated the is-
sue of liability for jurisdictional purposes in our courts might be
24 Id. at 681.
25 Id. at 680.
26 Id. at 681.
27 Id.; see Stansell v. Int’l Fellowship, Inc., 318 N.E.2d 149, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
The quoted Illinois statute, providing against preclusion, now appears as 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 5/2-301(b) (2005).  The same, unusual provision appears in TEX. R. CIV. P.
120a(2).
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subjected to a second trial of the issue on the merits in the courts of
another State.28
Third, if the defendant instead defaulted, he could later force a trial
on all the issues of liability by seeking relief from the default judg-
ment, because these issues would also be jurisdictional facts subject to
attack; and thus the plaintiff would suffer disadvantage:
The substantial objective of the new jurisdictional provisions is to
enable the plaintiff to obtain a trial of the issues of liability and of
damages in this State, when the circumstances make it the appropri-
ate and convenient forum for that purpose.  Under the suggested
construction, however, the nonresident defendant, merely by de-
faulting, could force trial of the issue of liability in his own State,
under the guise of a trial of the jurisdictional facts.  We think that
the General Assembly did not intend that the jurisdiction . . . could
be frustrated by a disregarding of the court’s process.29
After Nelson, other state and federal courts slightly refined these
insights to shape the prima facie standard of proof, which, as I have
explained, applies to jurisdictional facts overlapping the merits.30  But
curiously, the problem’s depths seemed to disappear from view.
Indeed, during the subsequent years, the sole perceptive discus-
sion came in the District of Massachusetts case of Val Leasing, Inc. v.
Hutson.31  In that case, a horse trailer owner sued in contract and tort
for inadequate renovation of the trailer.32  Jurisdiction rested solely
on alleged fraud during a telephone call from the defendant in Ar-
kansas to the plaintiff in Massachusetts.33  On pretrial motion, the
court upheld jurisdiction.34  But at trial, the jury rejected the fraud
count, while finding for the plaintiff otherwise.35  So the defendant
renewed his jurisdictional objection by means of a motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict.36
The Val Leasing court said, as background,
28 Nelson, 143 N.E.2d at 681; see Val Leasing, Inc. v. Hutson, 674 F. Supp. 53, 55 n.2
(D. Mass. 1987) (“Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that Hutson would argue that the
Court should re-apply the long arm statute to the facts as found by the jury.  Under this
theory the Court would have to find that jurisdiction never existed and dismiss the case on
jurisdictional grounds.  This would rob Hutson of the res judicata benefit of his fraud ver-
dict, since he would have no final adjudication on the merits.  The implausibility of permit-
ting such a barrier to finality is a perfect example of why the jury’s ultimate factual
determination is irrelevant to the correctness of the initial ruling.”).
29 143 N.E.2d at 681.
30 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
31 674 F. Supp. 53, 54–55 (D. Mass. 1987) (Young, J.) (observing that this problem of
establishing jurisdictional fact “is the subject of careful analysis in but few opinions”).
32 See id. at 54.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id.
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that, when personal jurisdiction is challenged, a plaintiff must estab-
lish a “threshold” showing of jurisdiction but no more.  That is,
through affidavits and other competent evidence, a plaintiff must
make out a prima facie case for the existence of personal jurisdiction,
demonstrating at minimum that there is competent evidence to
support each of the relevant jurisdictional prerequisites.37
Then, the district judge followed his premise to its logical conclusion:
Given this framework, there is nothing inconsistent between
the ruling of the motion judge that Val Leasing had put forward a
prima facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, and the sub-
sequent verdict in favor of Hutson on the fraud count after a trial
on the merits.  Thus, to the extent that Hutson thinks that the jury’s
resolution of the disputed fact issues requires this Court to “re-
think” the earlier denial of the motion to dismiss, he clearly is
wrong.38
In other words, whenever a jurisdictional fact overlaps the merits, the
prima facie standard should remain the standard of proof of that fact
for jurisdictional purposes throughout the proceedings, even on a
challenge after trial.  The jurisdictional fact is different in kind from
the merits fact:
It follows, therefore, that the determination by a trial judge that
the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant does not pur-
port to settle any disputed factual issues germane to the underlying
substantive claim.  What is settled is the court’s power to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, nothing more. Were this not
the case, a plaintiff would be precluded by a preliminary judicial
ruling from litigating disputed facts germane to the underlying sub-
stantive claim—surely a grave encroachment on the right to trial by
jury guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment.39
A singular feature of Val Leasing was the involvement of supple-
mental service, or pendent personal jurisdiction as the court called
it.40  Long-arm jurisdiction for the unsuccessful fraud count was the
sole basis of jurisdiction for the other counts.41  “The question, then,
[was] whether the judgment for Hutson (after trial on the merits) on
the ‘anchor’ claim of fraud removes the foundation for exercising ju-
risdiction with respect to the ‘pendent’ claims.”42  The judge held that
personal jurisdiction persisted.43  In other words, the loss on the mer-
its of the fraud count nonetheless left intact jurisdiction for that fraud
37 Id. at 55.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See id. at 56.
41 See id.
42 Id.
43 See id.
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count and, hence, for the other counts.  And, in still other words, the
judge thereby demonstrated a sincere belief in his conclusion that ju-
risdictional fact differs in kind from any overlapping merits fact and
so deserves a different standard of proof.
B. Fleshing Out the Doctrinal Detail
1. Procedural Settings for Decision on Jurisdiction
To flesh out the definition and implications of the prima facie
standard of proof, one must first examine the procedural settings in
which the jurisdictional issue will arise.44  By bringing any action, the
plaintiff asserts, at least implicitly, that the court has jurisdiction and is
a proper venue, and that the plaintiff will properly notify the defen-
dant.45  But sooner or later, the defendant may dispute the plaintiff’s
position and so create a contested issue.
In the ordinary course of the initial action, the defendant can chal-
lenge the plaintiff’s implicit or explicit assertions of forum authority,
but must do so by raising any personal defense early and in a way that
avoids waiver.46  If the defendant does raise any of the forum-authority
44 See generally CLERMONT, supra note 4, §§ 4.4, 5.1(B)(1) (summarizing various proce- R
dural incidents).
45 All these procedural incidents are similar in federal and state court.  Certain states,
however, require specific pleading of the basis for long-arm jurisdiction, and some of these
states will then impose the burden on the defendant to disprove jurisdiction. See 2 CASAD
& RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 6-1[3][a]–[b]. R
As to federal court subject-matter jurisdiction, the party invoking federal jurisdiction
must affirmatively allege the grounds upon which that jurisdiction depends. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(a) (2000) (notice of removal); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (complaint).  At any time in
the ordinary course of the federal action, including appeal, any party may challenge fed-
eral jurisdiction, and the trial or appellate court should on its own motion dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction when perceived; thus, even the party who invoked jurisdic-
tion may challenge such jurisdiction on appeal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3).  If
challenged, the party relying on federal jurisdiction will bear the burden of showing that
such jurisdiction exists. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178,
189 (1936).  Being courts of limited jurisdiction, the federal courts apply such subject-
matter jurisdiction requirements somewhat more strictly than do most state courts. See
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 7, 69 (6th ed. 2002);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. d (1982).
46 The defendant must be very careful to follow precisely the specified procedural
steps, making immediately clear that he is appearing specially to challenge territorial au-
thority to adjudicate, notice, or both, and that he is not appearing generally. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 10 cmt. b (1982).  The correct steps vary from state to
state. See id.  In federal court, the “special appearance” is less formalistic, instead coming
in the form of a Rule 12(b) defense:
• “lack of jurisdiction over the person” under Rule 12(b)(2), which is
read to cover all of the defense of lack of territorial jurisdiction;
• “improper venue” under Rule 12(b)(3);
• “insufficiency of process” under Rule 12(b)(4), which covers defects in
the form of the summons; and
• “insufficiency of service of process” under Rule 12(b)(5), which covers
defects in the manner of transmitting notice.
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defenses, the court must pass on them.  So much for the burden of
allegation.  The burdens of production and persuasion on these
threshold issues will be on the plaintiff (except as to the unreasona-
bleness test for territorial jurisdiction).47  The parties receive a reason-
able opportunity for discovery on any reasonably contestable issue of
forum authority.48  The judge may (1) hear and determine the de-
fense in a pretrial proceeding on the application of any party or (2)
choose to defer the issue until trial.49  The judge determines the issue
on documentary proof and affidavits and, if necessary, after an eviden-
tiary hearing.50
Subsequent to the ordinary course of the initial action, in certain cir-
cumstances that usually involve default in that initial action, an ag-
grieved person can raise the more serious forum-authority defenses by
seeking relief from judgment through direct or collateral attack.51
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).  The federal defendant must raise any such available defenses at
the very outset, either in a Rule 12(b) motion or in the answer, whichever comes first. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h).  With some risk, the defendant may first engage in certain prelimi-
nary procedural maneuvers, such as moving for an extension of time to respond. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 6(b).  But if the defendant first does anything more substantive, he waives those
threshold defenses. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).  Indeed, even after properly asserting
such defenses, the defendant may waive them by inconsistent activity, such as by asserting a
permissive counterclaim. See, e.g., Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 378 F.2d
241, 244–45 (9th Cir. 1967).
47 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985) (instructing that
while the plaintiff has the burden as to power, it is up to the defendant to show unreasona-
bleness—thus changing a natural-sounding reasonableness test into a somewhat grammati-
cally challenging unreasonableness test, which then operates as a counterpoint to the
power test).
Also, as to venue, there exists some dispute over who bears the burden of proof. See 2
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.32[4] (3d ed. 2005); 5B WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 12, § 1352, at 320–22 (favoring the majority rule of burdening R
plaintiff).
48 See 2 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 6-1[3][b], [d]. R
49 See id. § 6-1[3][b], at 9 & n.17, 13–14 & n.25.  In federal court the governing provi-
sion is FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
Additionally, in the post-trial period, a defense of lack of federal subject-matter juris-
diction will be determined whenever raised in the ordinary course of the initial action,
including on appeal. See supra note 45. R
50 See 2 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 6-1[3][b]. R
51 Relief from judgment refers to procedural techniques, other than in the ordinary
course of review in the trial and appellate courts, for avoiding the effects of the judgment.
See id. § 6-2.  It encompasses three major techniques: motion for relief, independent suit,
and collateral attack.  First, a party may attack a judgment in the rendering court by a
motion for relief from judgment. See id. § 6-2[1][a].  This extraordinary motion is techni-
cally considered a continuation of the initial action. See id. It is the preferred means of
overturning a judgment, being the most direct and orderly technique.  Second, if adequate
relief from judgment is unavailable by motion because of any applicable procedural limita-
tions on use of such motion, a person may bring an independent suit against the judg-
ment-holder to nullify or enjoin the enforcement of the judgment. See id. § 6-2[1][e].  The
essence here is a separate claim in equity, but one aimed directly at the prior judgment.
See id.  This suit is preferably, but not necessarily, brought in the rendering court, which
can exercise continuing jurisdiction.  Third, if someone in a subsequent action relies on a
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The procedural incidents of such a challenge remain much the same
as those just described, except for the burden of proof.  Upon an at-
tempt at relief from judgment by attacking its validity, the attacker
normally bears the burden.52  That is, in this late post-judgment set-
ting, the presumption shifts in favor of validity—and consequently,
the burden of proof would be on the attacker to establish invalidity,
rather than on the proponent of the judgment to show validity.53
prior judgment as a basis for claim or defense, as in a subsequent action where the plaintiff
sues upon the judgment to enforce it or where the defendant pleads res judicata, the
opponent may in that subsequent action attack the judgment to prevent its use. See id. § 6-
2[2].  The court will entertain this attack if adequate relief by one of the other procedural
techniques is not available and more convenient. See id.  This third technique is most often
called a collateral attack, distinguishing it from the direct attacks that come as a challenge
to a judgment in a proceeding brought specifically for that purpose. See id. § 6-2.
52 See id. § 6-2[l][b], [e], [2][a][i].
53 See id. While this proposition goes largely unquestioned as to collateral attack and
even independent suit, some courts resist the proposition with respect to motions for relief
from judgment. See id. § 6-2[1][b], at 32 & n.93, [e], at 36 & n.106, [2][a][i], at 41 &
n.119.  Yet even here, the better—and by now, majority—view is that finality interests dic-
tate shifting the burden of proof to the attacker, at least if the attacker had knowledge of
the prior action. See, e.g., Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir.
1986) (quoting Rohm & Haas Co. v. Aries, 103 F.R.D. 541, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), for the
proposition that “a defendant who was on notice of the original proceedings, had an op-
portunity, at that time, to oppose jurisdiction by a Rule 12 motion.  Such a motion avoids
prejudice to the plaintiff because all evidence needed to prove jurisdiction is readily availa-
ble.”); Coshatt v. Calmac Mfg. Corp., 602 P.2d 845, 846 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (finding it
unnecessary for a trial court to make an express determination in the record regarding the
“fairness” of its jurisdiction before entering a default judgment against a nonresident cor-
poration, because after judgment, there is a presumption of jurisdiction that the attacking
party must overcome). But see Ariel Waldman, Comment, Allocating the Burden of Proof in
Rule 60(b)(4) Motions to Vacate a Default Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
521, 536 (2001) (arguing that courts should place the burden on the movant but “should
condition the remedy to mitigate any resulting inequities”).
Although courts tend not to focus on the following subtlety, the best view would be
that only the burden of production shifts to the attacker, while the proponent of the judg-
ment retains the burden of persuasion (which means the risk of nonpersuasion, including
the risk of indeterminacy).  That is, the attacker must produce proof that the proponent
cannot show validity under the relevant standard of proof. See Hansen v. Pingenot, 739
P.2d 911, 913 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (“[A]t the hearing in Colorado, Pingenot tendered an
affidavit which states that he did not transact any business within the State of Missouri.
Hansen offered no evidence to the contrary.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that
Pingenot’s affidavit was sufficient to rebut the presumption of valid jurisdiction . . . .”);
Davis v. Nehf, 302 N.E.2d 382, 385–87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (on collateral attack, defendant
introduced evidence of lack of jurisdiction, but plaintiff had burden of persuasion); Jack-
son v. Randall, 544 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. App. 1976) (finding that the attackers had the
“burden of going forward with the evidence”). Thus, if the standard of proof is preponder-
ance, and if the attacker has shown equipoise (which is a fuzzy range rather than a point of
probability) while the proponent cannot push back the evidence, the attack succeeds. See
Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three, supra note 1, at 1122 n.36.  The reason would R
be that the defendant, who has a right to default in an action without jurisdiction, should
not have to prove by a preponderance that jurisdiction in fact does not exist.  The defen-
dant should have to prove no more than that the plaintiff cannot show jurisdiction to exist.
So, if neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can show, respectively, that jurisdiction does
or does not exist, then the defendant prevails.  That is, the defendant should have to pro-
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2. Applying the Standard of Proof
The appropriate burden and standard of proof on personal-juris-
dictional issues of fact are the same in both state courts, as in Nelson,
and federal courts, as in Val Leasing.  Perhaps, as a group, the former
set of courts to date has focused even less on the problem and so
shown more confusion.54  Probably, the latter should come to its own
independent resolution of the problem, as the majority of the few au-
thorities who have perceived the Erie question say that federal law con-
trols the burden and standard of proof on personal jurisdiction in
duce evidence, but should not have to assume the risk of indeterminacy simply because he
defaulted.  The easiest way to express this compromise is to say that the plaintiff retains the
burden of persuasion.
This very subtle distinction between production and persuasion might help to recon-
cile the above-described disagreement in the cases as to which side has the burden of proof
on a motion for relief from judgment.  After all, both attacker and proponent bear the
burden of proof, the former having the initial burden of production and the latter having
the ultimate burden of persuasion.  Thus, some of the cases cited as being in conflict by
Theresa L. Kruk, Annotation, Who Has Burden of Proof in Proceeding Under Rule 60(b)(4) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Have Default Judgment Set Aside on Ground That It Is Void for
Lack of Jurisdiction, 102 A.L.R. Fed. 811 (1991), may in fact be saying more or less the same
thing. Compare Bally Export Corp., 804 F.2d at 401 (affirming the lower court’s finding that
attackers “had submitted to Illinois jurisdiction by transacting business with Bally in Illi-
nois,” although cited as putting the burden on the attacker), with Packard Press Corp. v.
Com Vu Corp., 584 F. Supp. 73, 75–76 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (reasoning, even though cited as
putting the burden on the proponent, “The defendant has set forth prima facie meritorious
defenses. . . .  When the court’s in personam jurisdiction is challenged by the defendant, the
plaintiff must prove that the non-resident defendant’s activities in the forum state are suffi-
cient to bring it within the reach of this court’s jurisdiction.”).  In any event, the subtle
distinction nicely explains China Mariners’ Assurance Corp. v. M.T. W.M. Vacy Ash, No. 96
CIV. 9553 (PKL), 1999 WL 126921 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1999).  There the court’s premise
under Rule 60(b)(4) was that the “[d]efendant bears the burden of establishing its claims
for setting aside the default judgment, and must therefore show that service was not prop-
erly effected.” Id. at *3.  But the court concluded:
Unfortunately, the parties’ accounts of service cannot be reconciled.
Failing to describe the critical facts of the process server’s alleged service at
the Coral Gables address, plaintiff has not done enough to rebut defen-
dant’s claim of improper service. . . .
The highly controverted story behind service in this case leads the
Court to the somewhat reluctant conclusion that the default judgment en-
tered against defendant is void. . . .  This Court has recently pronounced
that . . . “where the parties’ accounts of the attempted service differ but
both are inherently plausible, and there is nothing in the record upon
which to judge the veracity of either version, a court should credit the ver-
sion of the party seeking to vacate the default.”
Id. at *6–*7 (quoting American Inst. of Cert. Pub. Accts. v. Affinity Card, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d
372, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
54 See, e.g., Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1980) (relying on
federal precedent to conclude, over dissent, that “plaintiff should not be required to prove
all of the merits of his case in a hearing designed for the purpose of determining
jurisdiction”).
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federal court.55  Still, no principle differentiates here between federal
and state courts.
Moreover, the burden and standard of proof on such jurisdic-
tional issues are matters on which the judge is largely free from consti-
tutional or statutory restriction.56  In this Article, I shall describe what
the better judges do in exercising that freedom, or would do when
real effects turned on the burden or standard of proof.  Admittedly,
even most of the better judges have ruled intuitively and without the
understanding necessary for cogent definition or for vision of the
implications.
All courts, then, should apply the prima facie standard of proof
whenever a jurisdictional fact overlaps the merits.57  “Overlapping”
here means that a factual finding in establishing personal jurisdiction
would also go toward proving the merits of the claim, with “merits”
broadly meaning those issues that arise other than in determining the
forum’s authority.58
55 See, e.g., Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651, 653 n.3 (8th Cir.
1982) (“[T]he question of burden of proof of personal jurisdiction in the federal courts is
not controlled by state law.”); Prod. Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 489–91
(5th Cir. 1974) (applying federal law to burdens of production and persuasion, and appar-
ently to specification of prima facie standard of proof too); 2 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note
3, § 6-1[3][b], at 9 n.17.  This majority view presumably relies on the premise that FED. R. R
CIV. P. 4(k), 12(b) & (d), and 60(b) cover the field.  Certainly, federal law would therefore
govern most of the procedural features of a jurisdictional challenge in federal court.  On
the particular feature of burden and standard, federal law should govern because the
strong federal interests in the sound workings of the federal courts demand a prima facie
standard, for all the reasons that this Article catalogues.
Nevertheless, this Erie conclusion is no slam dunk.  The Federal Rules are no longer to
be read broadly for Erie purposes, as held in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 430–31 (1996).  The Erie argument, in the absence of a Federal Rule, would involve
state interests and outcome-determinative effects similar to those that resulted in confiding
to state law the reach of personal jurisdiction on state-created claims, as held in Arrowsmith
v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc), and the burden and stan-
dard of proof on the merits, as held in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943).  Thus,
when a federal court is determining personal jurisdiction under state law, a decent argu-
ment exists in favor of applying state law to burden and standard. See, e.g., Wood Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Schultz, 613 F. Supp. 878, 882 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
56 See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Be-
cause there is no statutory method for resolving this issue, the mode of its determination is
left to the trial court.”).
57 Indeed, there is nothing uniquely American about this problem.  In a passing-off
case to which the Brussels Regulation applied on personal jurisdiction, the German Su-
preme Court had to decide where the harmful event occurred.  It observed: “It is not rele-
vant to an assessment of jurisdiction whether the defendant actually behaved contrary to
the rules of competition.  It is sufficient that such conduct has been alleged and cannot be
excluded from the outset.”  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 24,
2005, docket number I ZR 101/02, at juris online/Rechtsprechung, translated in [2006]
Int’l Litig. Proc. 125, 128, 2005 WL 3749705 (citation omitted).
58 An analogy is the same-issue limitation on issue preclusion. See RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 70 (1942) (providing for preclusion on “questions of fact” and some
“questions of law”).  As to the dimensions of a particular issue for issue preclusion pur-
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Where thus applicable, the prima facie standard on a jurisdic-
tional fact entails truly a factual showing—that is, a probabilistic deter-
mination made on the basis of evidence.59  The court must weigh the
evidence such as it is, even though requiring less than a preponder-
ance showing.  Many courts express mechanical proof rules, such as
accepting the plaintiff’s allegations to be true in case of conflict.60  But
the court should resist the allure of such mechanical rules,61 unless
poses, the modern view is that the scope of an issue should be determined in light of the
efficiency/fairness rationale of res judicata: whether a matter to be presented in a subse-
quent action constitutes the same issue as a matter presented in the initial action is a
pragmatic question, turning on such factors as the degree of overlap between the factual
evidence and legal argument advanced with respect to the matter in the initial action and
that to be advanced with respect to the matter in the subsequent action. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982).
A similar approach would be possible for determining whether the same issue arises as
to both jurisdiction and the merits.  But the analogy is not perfect. The policies in this
setting differ somewhat from the policies of res judicata.  Thus, it seems slightly better to
ask whether a finding of a jurisdictional fact would also go toward proving the merits,
rather than whether the finding actually equates to some “issue” on the merits.
59 See Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 676–78 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing a
variety of lower standards).
Consequently, on appeal the standard of review should be “clearly erroneous.” See
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2003), dismissed on
reh’g en banc, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005); Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, 291
F.3d 738, 746 (11th Cir. 2002); U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 241
F.3d 135, 151 (2d Cir. 2001).  Admittedly, a number of cases and commentators declare
that appellate courts should review prima facie jurisdictional determinations under a de
novo standard. See, e.g., Boit, 967 F.2d at 675; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, § 1067.6, R
at 571 & n.18. But these authorities are conceiving of the prima facie standard as some sort
of mechanical proof rule, such as a demurrer-like technique of accepting the plaintiff’s
allegations as true.  If instead the prima facie standard is actually a factual one, then the
clearly erroneous standard of review should apply. See Boit, 967 F.2d at 676, 678; 5B
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, § 1351, at 314–16.  Similarly, the tougher appellate scru- R
tiny that applies to decisions on motions for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of
law is not an argument against applying the deferential standard of review to decisions of
jurisdictional fact.  Even though the trial court employs on those motions a standard of
proof that could be analogized to prima facie proof, its decisions receive the close appel-
late scrutiny given to a question of law because they represent a shortcut to dispose of the
case on the merits. See 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS
OF REVIEW §§ 3.09, 5.02 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the law label here as an artifice).
Contrariwise, if the trial court on the jurisdictional decision uses a prima facie stan-
dard in determining the applicable law rather than fact, see infra text accompanying notes
116–30, then for the usual institutional reasons the standard of review should revert to R
nondeferential. See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra, § 2.21(G).  On distinguishing law from fact
in this context, see generally Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (drawing a
law/fact line for purposes of standard of review, and saying discriminatory intent under
civil rights statute is a question of fact entitled to deferential review); 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS,
supra, ch. 2 (discussing the law/fact distinction for appellate review); Evan Tsen Lee, Princi-
pled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict,
64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1991) (same).
60 See 2 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 6-1[3][b], at 12 n.22; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, R
supra note 12, § 1067.6, at 563–67. R
61 See, e.g., Val Leasing, Inc. v. Hutson, 674 F. Supp. 53, 55 & n.1 (D. Mass. 1987).
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they act merely as heuristics in helping to implement a factual
standard.62
Once embraced, the prima facie standard causes significant oddi-
ties and hesitancies to melt away.  These benefits flow from the simpli-
fied and streamlined threshold procedure, which can decide
jurisdiction without dragging in the case’s merits completely.  This
procedure avoids the waste and other impracticalities of a full-dress
preliminary hearing that would really be a trial, as well as the unfair-
ness of a defendant’s obtaining only a jurisdictional dismissal for what
was really a victory on the merits.
First, consider the judge/jury problem.  In a common-law-type ac-
tion, there will often be a trial by jury.63  In those cases, the jury will
decide the issues that are contestable and factual, while the judge de-
termines the law.64  Jurisdictional facts are traditionally classified as
questions of law for jury-trial purposes.65  Nevertheless, the authorities
equivocate when jurisdictional facts overlap the merits, saying that
maybe a jury has to pass on jurisdiction because a jury right exists on
the same facts involved in the merits.66  This equivocation is the prod-
uct of the confusion that results from failing to take account of the
difference in the standards of proof on the jurisdictional and merits
62 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Conflicts between the
affidavits submitted on the question of personal jurisdiction are thus resolved in favor of
the plaintiff.  When, as in this case, personal jurisdiction is predicated on the commission
of a tort within the state, of course the jurisdictional question involves some of the same
issues as the merits of the case, and the plaintiff must make a prima facie case on the merits
to withstand a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(2).”) (citations omitted), reh’g denied
with opinion, 712 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1983).
63 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, § 2.4(B). R
64 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (drawing a law/
fact line for purposes of jury right by a historical and functional test); Paul F. Kirgis, The
Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125,
1125 (2003) (looking to history to argue that under the Seventh Amendment “questions
requiring inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute are ‘fact’
questions, which must be decided by the jury in appropriate cases”); Colleen P. Murphy,
Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723,
754 (1993) (arguing that by text, precedent, and policy, the Seventh Amendment’s role in
this context is to preserve the “essence” or “substance” of the jury).
65 See Note, Trial by Jury of Preliminary Jurisdictional Facts in Federal Courts, 48 IOWA L.
REV. 471, 479, 481 (1963) (noting that jurisdiction is an issue collateral to the merits, and
thus that no jury right exists); Steven Kessler, Note, The Right to a Jury Trial for Jurisdictional
Issues, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 149 (1984) (“[T]he constitutional right to trial by jury
should be confined to the merits of the case, and should not extend to preliminary juris-
dictional issues.”); cf. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Essay, The Myth of the Law-Fact
Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2003) (“[T]he decision to label an issue ‘law’ or
‘fact’ is a functional one based on who should decide it under what standard, and is not
based on the nature of the issue.”).
66 See, e.g., Friedman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 181 F. Supp. 327, 329 (W.D.
Pa. 1960) (stating that there is jury right “where the jurisdictional question of joint venture
is closely tied to the merits”); Note, supra note 65, at 480–81, 489; Kessler, supra note 65, at R
165–66.
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issues.  Whether a fact exists to a prima facie degree is a different issue
from whether the fact exists to a preponderance.  So, even when there
is a jurisdictional challenge that involves facts also involved in the mer-
its of the claim, the judge should be able to decide the jurisdictional
challenge on his own and at the outset of the action.  That is, the
judge can decide jurisdiction without the intervention of a jury—and
without fear of stepping on any jury right.67
Most notably, the res judicata and law-of-the-case problem disappears
under a regime of prima facie proof.  If a court were to find a fact by a
preponderance in deciding jurisdiction, and that fact is common to
the merits, there could be unexpected and undesirable preclusive ef-
fects on those merits.68  Lowering the standard of proof is the ready
cure.  An affirmative finding on contested jurisdictional facts by a
prima facie standard will not affect the merits, because facts found by
a lower standard of proof will not preclude issues governed by a
higher standard of proof;69 but a finding of jurisdiction will preclude
later relief from judgment for lack of jurisdiction, by the ordinary op-
eration of the jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction doctrine.70  Alter-
natively, under existing law, a finding of no jurisdiction does not
produce a valid judgment and so should not be binding in another
action, except to defeat jurisdiction in any attempt to sue again in a
court where the same jurisdictional issue arises.71  The resulting basic
rule—that a jurisdictional finding will not carry over to the merits—
derives from breaking the identity between jurisdictional facts and
those on the merits, which was the source of all the oddities and hesi-
tancies in this corner of the law.72
Finally, consider the relief-from-judgment problem.  Under a prima
facie regime, a default judgment will not leave the merits open to full
litigation, under the guise of a jurisdictional inquiry, upon a collateral
attack or other request for relief from judgment.73  Once again, differ-
ing standards of proof break the identity of jurisdiction and merits to
avoid the danger.  Consequently, if the defendant were later to launch
a collateral attack, all that the plaintiff would have to establish on the
67 See Val Leasing, Inc. v. Hutson, 674 F. Supp. 53, 55 (D. Mass. 1987); Homburger,
supra note 19, at 85. R
68 See supra note 9.
69 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982).
70 See id. § 10(2).
71 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, § 4.4(B)(3); Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive R
Abstention: Issue Preclusion and Jurisdictional Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 193,
216–20 (2001) (addressing the preclusive effect of a federal court’s dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction).
72 The desirability of this basic rule receives confirmation from the specific Illinois
and Texas provisions discussed supra note 27. R
73 See supra note 11.
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overlapping jurisdictional facts is a prima facie showing.74  From the
example of Shirley v. Jim, if Jim were to introduce evidence negating
intercourse, Shirley could defeat this later attack by merely showing
that her allegation was plausible.
3. Noneffect of Procedural Setting on Standard
The prescribed approach to proving jurisdictional fact is straight-
forward: the proponent of personal jurisdiction must make the usual
showing of “more likely than not,” except that when the fact overlaps
the merits of the claim, the proponent need provide only prima facie
proof to establish jurisdiction.  This statement requires only one fur-
ther qualification,75 and the procedural setting is not it.
As described above,76 the jurisdictional issue may arise in a variety
of procedural settings.  Courts have sometimes yielded to the tempta-
tion of varying the standard of proof in response to the particular pro-
cedural setting.  That is, they may boost the standard to a higher
required probability if the parties have had jurisdictional discovery,77
and may boost it even higher if the court has held a pretrial eviden-
tiary hearing on jurisdiction.78  Most prominently, judges often say
that they would raise the prima facie standard all the way to prepon-
derance if they were to postpone the decision on personal jurisdiction
until trial.79  Or, more strangely, they sometimes adjust the standard
74 See Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 459–60 (7th Cir. 1992) (dictum) (Posner,
J.).
75 See infra Part I.B.4.
76 See supra Part I.B.1.
77 See, e.g., Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039,
1043 (2d Cir. 1990); Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.
1990); In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123–25 (D.D.C. 2003); Shapiro,
Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70–71 (D.D.C. 1998), motion ruled on,
90 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2000).
78 See, e.g., Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999); Bank Brus-
sels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999); Data Disc,
Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977); Myers v. Johns Manville Sales
Corp., 600 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Nev. 1984) (“The plaintiff’s burden varies in difficulty
according to the limits imposed by the court on the pretrial proceedings.”).
79 See, e.g., Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675–78 (1st Cir. 1992) (discuss-
ing lower standards for pretrial motions, but assuming they would not apply at trial); Dorf
v. Complastik Corp., 735 A.2d 984, 988–90 (Me. 1999). These two cases concern jurisdic-
tional facts that overlap the merits, showing judges’ propensity to adjust the prima facie
standard in response to the procedural setting.  But a similar judicial willingness to apply a
lower standard on a pretrial decision prevails even when the appropriate standard of proof
on a non-overlapping jurisdictional fact is unquestionably the preponderance standard.
See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 831–32 (5th Cir. 1986),
modified on other grounds, 836 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1988).  Thus, many cases seem to say that a
prima facie showing suffices to withstand any pretrial motion to dismiss for jurisdiction,
even though the preponderance standard applies to the jurisdictional fact otherwise. See 2
CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 6-1[3][b], at 9 n.17, 12 & n.23; 2 MOORE ET AL., supra R
note 47, § 12.31[5].  As I soon will explain, however, lowering the standard for early deter- R
minations is nonsensical, because the lowered standard would force defendants who even-
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of proof to reflect some unrelated procedural option, as when they
require the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction more clearly if the plain-
tiff seeks a preliminary injunction.80
Nonetheless, courts should resist such temptation.  They should
not vary the jurisdictional standard of proof with differences in the
procedural setting, even assuming that they are really capable of accu-
rately adjusting and readjusting the standard of proof by fine de-
gree.81  Instead of changing the standard of proof, courts should
afford the fuller procedures, allowing discovery and an evidentiary
hearing if necessary to apply properly the consistently applicable stan-
dard of proof.82  Alternatively, the court may choose to defer decision
under that same standard until such time as those fuller procedures
become efficient to employ, perhaps at trial on the merits,83 although
courts should be somewhat reluctant to postpone because delay can
tually prevail on the merits to defend in a forum where by law they supposedly need not
defend.  Furthermore, it risks imposing on these defendants a jurisdictional dismissal after
they successfully defend on the merits unless they can then consent to jurisdiction.  So,
how does one account for this common but nonsensical judicial pronouncement?  Most
likely, such judicial statements in favor of an early lowered standard are merely loose and
confused talk to which the court has no intention of giving tangible effect.  Indeed, appar-
ently no actual case exists in which the court upheld jurisdiction by a lowered standard on
pretrial motion and then properly found no jurisdiction at trial under the higher standard,
as opposed to cases that straightforwardly postponed the jurisdictional issue until determi-
nation at trial. See 2 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 6-1[3][b], at 14 & n.26.  In reality, R
then, this use of the prima facie standard for only pretrial purposes may serve merely as an
inarticulate rule of thumb for determining whether to postpone the jurisdictional determi-
nation until trial.  That is, if the plaintiff can make a plausible jurisdictional showing at the
threshold, the judge will invoke discretion to postpone determination until later; but
whenever the judge actually decides jurisdiction, the standard of proof on a non-overlap-
ping jurisdictional fact will be preponderance of the evidence.
80 See, e.g., Visual Sci., Inc. v. Integrated Commc’ns Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.
1981) (“A prima facie showing of jurisdiction will not suffice, however, where a plaintiff
seeks preliminary injunctive relief.  A court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party
before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him. . . .  Where a
challenge to jurisdiction is interposed on an application for a preliminary injunction ‘[t]he
plaintiff is required to adequately establish that there is at least a reasonable probability of
ultimate success upon the question of jurisdiction when the action is tried on the merits.’
Industrial Electronics Corp. v. Cline, 330 F.2d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1964).”); Am. Para Prof’l
Sys., Inc. v. LabOne, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 450, 454 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“This burden varies,
however, depending upon the procedural posture of the case.”). The explanation lies in
the premise of these cases, which was that the standard would rise from prima facie at
pretrial to preponderance at trial, before final relief could be given. See supra note 79. R
81 The quantum-step insight, discussed later, further argues against calling for fine
adjustments in the standard of proof. See infra text accompanying notes 112–113. R
82 See Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 899 F.2d 109, 114–16 (1st
Cir. 1990); Priess v. Fisherfolk, 535 F. Supp. 1271, 1275 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (“If the memo-
randa, affidavits and discovery materials present disputed issues of credibility and fact con-
cerning personal jurisdiction, the Court should deny the motion to dismiss and hold an
evidentiary hearing on the controverted issues.”); Peterson v. Spartan Indus., Inc., 310
N.E.2d 513 (N.Y. 1974) (holding that a plaintiff need not establish prima facie jurisdiction
under the long-arm statute before being given an opportunity for discovery).
83 See supra text accompanying note 49. R
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unfairly and awkwardly force the defendant to litigate in a place that
turns out to lack personal jurisdiction.
Keeping the standard of proof for jurisdiction constant, regard-
less of the procedural setting, works to dissipate potential problems.
For example, the contrary practice of raising the standard of proof at
trial would risk imposing on defendants a jurisdictional dismissal after
the successful defense on the merits, unless the defendants can then
consent to jurisdiction and thereby sidestep the payback for their suc-
cess.  For another example, that contrary practice would create
problems in applying the Steel Co. rule, which says that a court must
decide jurisdiction-like issues first.84  To illustrate, a court might find
jurisdiction to exist prima facie on a pretrial motion, then go on to
rule on other motions and hold a trial, and finally decide that jurisdic-
tion does not exist by a preponderance.  This way of opening an af-
firmative jurisdictional determination to reconsideration at trial
under a higher standard of proof would undermine the policies be-
hind Steel Co.’s first-things-first rule, because by then a court without
jurisdiction will have taken many steps.
Also worrisome would be any judicial inclination to vary the stan-
dard of proof with the defendant’s chosen time for challenging juris-
diction (i.e., special appearance at the outset or later relief from
judgment, whether by direct or collateral attack).  On special appear-
ance, on a pretty light showing the court might incline to say that the
plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to proceed to the merits, when
the defendant will have an opportunity to continue trying to defeat
the plaintiff’s claim.  On collateral attack, the court might instead in-
cline to indulge the defaulting defendant when deciding the jurisdic-
tional contest, raising the standard for the plaintiff’s proof and so
enabling the defendant to maintain that the plaintiff had wrongly
sued this defendant in that first forum; there is a certain appeal to
letting the defendant demonstrate, say, that a hallucinating plaintiff
fabricated a story to sue the upright defendant in an abusive forum.
Nevertheless, the law shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on
subsequent attack, so it seems to reject any urge to indulge a collater-
ally attacking defendant.85  Moreover, a higher standard for the plain-
tiff on collateral attack by the defendant would open the door a bit to
collateral attack after special-appearance-then-default, because the de-
84 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998).  The rule
certainly covers personal jurisdiction as well as subject-matter jurisdiction, see Ruhrgas AG
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999), but may not stretch so far as to cover forum
non conveniens, see Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int’l Co., 436 F.3d 349,
361–64 (3d Cir. 2006).
85 See supra text accompanying note 53. R
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fendant could argue that the earlier finding under the lower standard
of proof is not preclusive.86
In particular, the standard of proof for jurisdictional facts that
overlap the merits should not, at some procedural stage, jump from
prima facie to preponderance.  It should not be that a plaintiff can get
to trial by a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, but once at trial must
show both jurisdiction and liability by a preponderance.  As I have
explained, the delayed jump in the jurisdictional standard of proof
would have forced winning defendants to defend on the merits where
by law it turns out they did not have a true obligation to defend, and it
would also risk imposing on those defendants a jurisdictional dismis-
sal after what would have been a successful defense on the merits un-
less they can then consent to jurisdiction.87  Moreover, saying that
preponderance is the ultimately applicable standard for jurisdiction
reintroduces variations of the judge/jury problem, the res judicata
and law-of-the-case difficulty, and unnecessary exposure of the result-
ing judgment to subsequent attack seeking relief from judgment—in
short, all the undesirable consequences that prompted the adoption
of a prima facie standard in the first place.
An especially blatant problem with a varying standard of proof
came to light in the intriguing case of Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc.88
In that case, the Kingsmen sued to reacquire the rights to their hit
song, “Louie, Louie.”89  The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, arguing that they lacked minimum contacts with
California.90  The plaintiffs showed a series of licensing agreements
that the defendants had entered into with California companies, out
of which the cause of action arose, “as it is the failure of the defend-
ants to provide royalties on these and other licensing agreements that
serves as the basis for plaintiffs’ suit” laid “in a forum where they took
actions that allegedly constituted a breach of the contract at issue.”91
The district court found this showing to satisfy the prima facie stan-
dard.92  The case proceeded through pretrial and trial, with the plain-
tiffs winning judgment.93  The defendants did not further pursue the
jurisdictional point until appeal, when they urged that the standard of
86 See supra text accompanying note 69. R
87 See supra text accompanying note 10.
88 140 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998) (William Fletcher, J.).  Professor Tobias Wolff
brought this case to my attention.
89 See id. at 1316.
90 See id. at 1317.
91 Id. at 1320.
92 See id. at 1317.
93 See id.
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proof for personal jurisdiction should be preponderance and that the
existing trial-court record must contain that showing.94
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming, rejected the defendants’ argu-
ment for the higher standard of proof.95  Common sense demanded
this result.  But the court had to struggle doctrinally to reach that re-
sult, because it began with the premise that the standard would in-
deed have been a preponderance if and when the defendants had
urged again at trial the lack of personal jurisdiction.96  It then had to
rationalize, in this case, dropping the standard back down to prima
facie on appeal:
In this case, none of the parties developed a record on the issue of
personal jurisdiction beyond the few submissions each made in liti-
gating the defendants’ motion to dismiss.  From the plaintiffs’ per-
spective, there must have seemed little reason to do so: Plaintiffs
prevailed on the personal jurisdiction question on pre-trial motion,
and defendants did not contest the issue any further.  Defendants
cannot now capitalize upon the plaintiffs’ early victory.  Rather, de-
fendants may seek appellate review only of the issue that they actu-
ally contested below: whether or not plaintiffs made out a prima
facie case for personal jurisdiction, and whether the district court
was correct in denying the motion to dismiss.97
These mental gymnastics were unnecessary.  The correct result
would have followed so much more simply if the Ninth Circuit had
recognized that a prima facie showing suffices at pretrial, during trial,
and on appeal for jurisdictional facts that overlap the merits.  More
generally, the appropriate standard of proof—be it preponderance
for most jurisdictional issues or some lower standard when the juris-
dictional facts overlap the merits—should consistently apply before,
during, and after trial.  Among many advantages, this approach thus
complies with the law of simplicity, or of parsimony and elegance,
thus escaping the slash of Occam’s Razor.
4. Effect of Factual Hierarchy on Standard
Yet, as Einstein supposedly put it, “Everything should be made as
simple as possible, but not simpler.”98  And another moment’s
thought will suggest that the precise meaning of the malleable term of
94 See id.
95 See id. at 1319–20.
96 See id. at 1319.
97 Id.
98 E.g., Quotable Quotes, READER’S DIG., July 1977, at 42; Collected Quotes from Albert
Einstein, http://rescomp.stanford.edu/~cheshire/EinsteinQuotes.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2006).  Although many sources repeat this quote or a variant, neither I nor others have
been able to locate it in Einstein’s writings or speeches. See THE NEW QUOTABLE EINSTEIN
290 (Alice Calaprice ed., 2005) (“Everyone seems to know it, yet no one can find its origi-
nal source.”).
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prima facie proof should turn on which particular fact the defendant
is contesting.
On the one hand, think of mistaken identity for a defendant who
defaulted because he had no connection whatsoever with a totally mis-
led plaintiff.  Upon enforcement of the default judgment at the defen-
dant’s home, the system would intuitively let him maintain that the in-
state actor had not been him, even if the plaintiff could make a plausi-
ble showing of same name and likeness.99  Foreclosing collateral at-
tack would be unfair.  Indeed, that result would create a worldwide
service provision.  No defendant could risk defaulting, because too
much would be at stake under conditions too uncertain.
On the other hand, the system would incline to treat location of
the jurisdictional act differently.  It would lean away from allowing the
defendant to litigate fully that locational fact.100  If the plaintiff could
show a prima facie likelihood that the act took place on the right side
of the state border, the defendant should appear in the first forum to
litigate.  If the defendant chooses to default, then on collateral attack
the defendant can maintain as to location only that the plaintiff can-
not make a prima facie showing.  This resistance to relief explains
why, when courts or commentators want to justify the existence of col-
lateral attack, they never speak of location but instead always use ex-
amples closer to the identity end of the spectrum.101
Thus, in any specific case, there appears to be a spectrum, or
rather a hierarchy, of jurisdictional facts.  For example, thinking back
to the Shirley v. Jim case, the jurisdictional facts include:
• identity (nexus to defendant);102
• intercourse (act);103
99 See Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 2002) (deciding relief was
available, while observing: “To prove that the judgment was void for lack of personal juris-
diction, Fratelli Tanfoglio raises an assertedly meritorious defense (identity of the pistol’s
manufacturer) that the district court’s default judgment on the merits had flatly rejected.
Because the identity of the pistol’s manufacturer has ramifications for both jurisdiction
and the merits, the ‘foundational principle’ embodied in Rule 60(b)(4) collides head-on
with a well-established rule of claim preclusion.”).
100 See Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting of the plaintiff on a
motion to dismiss that “he must also make a prima facie showing that the tort occurred
within the state”), reh’g denied with opinion, 712 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1983); Dustin v. Cruise
Craft, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 67, 69 (D.N.H. 1980) (upholding jurisdiction when “one might
justifiably conclude that the boat as likely capsized in New Hampshire territorial waters as
in Maine territorial waters”).
101 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc.,
64 F. Supp. 2d 839, 846–47 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (using an example of a defendant who can
show she was never a partner of a person who signed the contract and therefore cannot be
subjected to jurisdiction by it), rev’d on other grounds, 212 F.3d 1031 (7th Cir. 2000).
102 See supra note 99. R
103 See Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988) (reversing pretrial dismis-
sal for lack of jurisdiction, where the issue was the defendant’s in-state acts, and observing:
“In the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in which no eviden-
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• location (nexus to sovereign);104
• impregnation (result);105 and
• failure to support (legal liability).106
The legal system would apply a high standard of proof to identity for
jurisdictional purposes, requiring the plaintiff to achieve at least equi-
poise on that issue.  Meanwhile, it would require the plaintiff merely
to allege failure to support, rather than to prove it at all for jurisdic-
tional purposes, leaving the parties to litigate legal liability on the
merits.  It would then apply the prima facie standard of proof to the
facts in between, but prima facie would imply a different rigor for the
different facts: the system might require the “slightest possibility” for
the result of impregnation, meaning little more than good-faith alle-
gation; “reasonable possibility” for the location of the act, implying
that reasonable fact finders could differ; and the higher showing of a
“substantial possibility” for the fact of intercourse.
Perhaps this gradated meaning of prima facie seems overly sub-
tle.  But such subtle refinement becomes necessary for clear thinking
whenever a lower standard of proof prevails.  Again, for example, if
Shirley must show impregnation merely as the slightest possibility,
then even Jim’s DNA evidence refuting impregnation would not de-
feat jurisdiction in the original action, but would go solely to the mer-
its; Jim would win the case, but the DNA fight would not play out on a
jurisdiction motion.  The irrelevance of DNA to jurisdiction would
continue to prevail even if Jim defaulted and then sought relief from
judgment for lack of jurisdiction; Jim would then have to produce
proof that Shirley could not show the slightest possibility of his having
impregnated her or, in other words, produce proof that banishes all
doubt,107 which really is an impossible standard to meet in this uncer-
tiary hearing is held, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
jurisdiction over the movant, non-resident defendant.  A prima facie case is established if
the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for a directed verdict.”) (cita-
tions omitted).
104 See supra note 100. R
105 See Mountain States Sports, Inc. v. Sharman, 353 F. Supp. 613, 617 (D. Utah 1972)
(“However, the court interprets the Utah law to require only a good faith allegation of
injury in order to vest the court with power to proceed to trial.”).
106 See Prod. Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 1974) (consider-
ing pretrial dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and agreeing with appellant that “the task
required only a prima facie showing of the facts on which jurisdiction was predicated, not a
prima facie demonstration of the existence of a cause of action. . . .  In order to make a
prima facie showing of the facts on which jurisdiction was predicated under the contract
portion of the statute, appellant did not have to show prima facie evidence of a breach of
contract.  Rather, appellant had to present prima facie evidence that (1) a contract to be
performed in whole or in part within Texas existed between itself and appellees and (2)
the present suit arose out of that contractual arrangement.”).
107 See supra note 53. R
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tain world108 and therefore results in the existence of jurisdiction.109
For a contrary example, equally strong evidence on the issue of inter-
course would defeat jurisdiction, on special appearance or on collat-
eral attack.  Shirley must show a substantial possibility of intercourse
having occurred.  If Jim can produce contrary evidence of strength
comparable to DNA evidence, then he could defeat jurisdiction,
whenever he properly challenged it.
Moreover, this gradation of the standard of proof does not spring
only from this sort of intuition or logic.  Fairness and other jurisdic-
tional policies additionally argue that the system should be quite con-
fident of the defendant’s identity and at least somewhat confident that
he committed the act of intercourse, but it should be less concerned
about litigating, as a matter of jurisdiction, the location and results of
that act.  Indeed, the wording of specific state long-arm statutes (e.g.,
“the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the
child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse”110) suggests,
or even imposes, such a hierarchy of facts as it downplays the needed
showing of conception.111
Consequently, as much as any theoretician would dislike the
messiness of a hierarchy of facts, courts are implicitly going to invoke
one when they apply the prima facie standard in real cases.  And the
law would be wise to concede, by recognizing the hierarchy explicitly
and then trying to control it.
In doing so, the temptation could arise for legislators or courts to
take advantage of the malleability of the prima facie term by attempt-
ing to adjust the standard to an infinite fineness in response to the
contested fact’s importance.  My own view, based on cognitive science,
is that the boundedly rational human mind cannot reliably make such
fine adjustments, and so the law should not call upon it to do so.112
Just as the traditional standards of proof above equipoise have coa-
lesced around (1) preponderance of the evidence, (2) clear and con-
vincing evidence, and (3) beyond a reasonable doubt, the standards
of proof below equipoise should follow a quantum-step approach that
108 For a discussion of possible Cartesian arguments regarding uncertainty, see Gary
Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 871–74 (1992).
109 But with his DNA evidence, which is increasingly common, Jim might get relief
from judgment on other grounds like fraud, or modify the judgment to lift future obliga-
tions for support. See generally Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to Be Daddy
Anymore: An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193 (2004)
(discussing the success of disproving paternity with DNA testing).
110 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 580-201(6) (McKinney 2005).
111 See supra note 5. R
112 See Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three, supra note 1, at 1152 n.144 (discuss- R
ing the inappropriateness of a sliding scale for jurisdictional facts).
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recognizes only the gradations of (1) slightest possibility, (2) reasona-
ble possibility, and (3) substantial possibility.113
The task for the law, then, is to assign an appropriate standard of
proof to each contested jurisdictional element, one that reflects the
direct costs of applying the standard and the element’s importance in
terms of the expected value of resultant errors, giving due weight to
the differential between the policy against failing to provide a forum
to the plaintiff (Type II error) and the policy against failing to limit
the burden on the defendant (Type I error).114  The aim is to mini-
mize the sum of the costs, but the trick is to specify properly the
sources and magnitudes of all the various costs.  Earlier in this Article,
it was the costs of applying a preponderance standard to overlapping
jurisdictional issues—direct costs such as holding a full-dress hearing,
as well as the consequences as to jury right, preclusion, and subse-
quent attack—that drove the standard down to prima facie proof.115
Now, it is the varying differential between Type I and Type II error
costs that causes further adjustment in the meaning of prima facie for
different jurisdictional elements, so that courts will demand a stronger
jurisdictional showing on the defendant’s identity than on the act’s
location.  At any rate, this task of assigning the appropriate standard
of proof to each element is a typical and traditional one for the law,
here made easier by realizing that the choice is among only the quan-
tum steps on the lower half of the probability scale.
II
BREADTH OF THE STANDARD’S APPLICATION
The described approach to proving jurisdiction turns out to be as
broadly applicable as it is simple to state.  Although courts give it ex-
plicit recognition most often in connection with personal-jurisdic-
tional fact, courts implicitly apply it much more broadly.
A. Extending Beyond Fact to Law
The first step outward would be from fact to law, a step all too
obviously necessitated by long-arm statutes that refer to acts such as
“commission of a tortious act within this State.”116  So, what is the re-
quired showing on the legal question of whether the alleged facts con-
stitute a tort?
113 Cf. id. at 1122–25 (developing these three gradations in connection with harmless-
error and police-search law).
114 See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 366–67 (2001); Clermont, Pro-
cedure’s Magical Number Three, supra note 1, at 1118–21; Clermont, Standards of Proof in Ja- R
pan, supra note 1, at 267–72. R
115 See supra text accompanying notes 8–11.
116 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-209(a)(2) (2005).
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This seemingly straightforward inquiry raises the profound ques-
tion of how the notion of standard of proof applies to issues of law.
The profundity of this question could counsel its avoidance when pos-
sible.  Thus, the wise course may be for jurisdictional statutes to avoid
the use of terms, like “tortious,” that connote a legal outcome.117  Sim-
ilarly, when left free to shape doctrine, courts might try to avoid or
construe away any legal overlap between jurisdiction and the merits,
or read the jurisdictional statute to require the plaintiff merely to al-
lege something like “the facts might constitute a cause of action.”118  If,
however, the court finds such avoidance to be statutorily foreclosed,
or finds drawing a line between law and fact to be especially difficult,
the court has to face the profound but neglected question of the stan-
dard of proof for law.
Happily, that question turns out to have a relatively straightfor-
ward answer.  Simply put, for the purposes of required showing, no
momentous distinction lies between fact and law; they are epistemo-
logical equivalents.119  “If one makes any propositional claims about
what the law is, regardless of what one has in mind by ‘law,’ one is
making claims of fact.”120
To establish any proposition, whether of fact or law and in any
context, we look to evidence.  That look must entail three steps: we
will apply rules of admissibility of evidence, we will employ analytic
methods for measuring and combining the significance or weight of
that evidence, and we will require the combined evidence’s weight to
exceed some standard before declaring the proposition proved.121
The concern here is the last of the necessary steps—applying the stan-
117 See Prod. Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 1974) (distin-
guishing long-arm statute for contract actions, which usually does not read as if it requires
proof of the cause of action); 1 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 4-2[2][a][iii]; cf. R
Homburger, supra note 19, at 86–87 (noting that this whole standard of proof problem can R
generally be avoided by ensuring that jurisdictional facts do not overlap the merits).
118 See Baldwin v. Household Int’l, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 273, 277 (Tex. App. 2001) (“When
reaching a decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction based on the defendant’s alleged
commission of a tort, the trial court should rely only upon the necessary jurisdictional facts
and should not reach the merits of the case.  In other words, ultimate liability in tort is not
a jurisdictional fact, and the merits of the cause are not at issue.  When the plaintiff alleges
an action in tort that arose out of an act committed in Texas, the necessary proof is only
that the purposeful act was committed in this State. . . .  The act or omission within the
state is a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to determine whether or not the act
or omission gives rise to liability in tort.”) (citations omitted).
119 See Allen & Pardo, supra note 65, at 1770 (“Thus, the quest to find ‘the’ essential R
difference between the two that can control subsequent classifications of questions as legal
or factual is doomed from the start, as there is no essential difference.”).
120 Lawson, supra note 108, at 865 (“[A] proposition by definition is the sort of state- R
ment that can be either true or false.”).  “Whatever one’s metaphysical theory of law may
be, any positive propositions derived from that theory are, from an epistemological stand-
point, claims of fact.” Id. at 863.
121 See id. at 861–77.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\91-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 30  7-JUN-06 11:44
1002 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:973
dard of proof.  “The need for standards of proof and the effect of
standards of proof on interpretative outcomes are independent of the
admissibility and significance rules of one’s theory of interpreta-
tion.”122  One simply cannot talk about accepting a proposition with-
out, at least implicitly, invoking a standard of proof.  The necessity of
a standard of proof is therefore just as real for law as for fact.
Strangely, however, we tend not to speak of standards of proof for
law.  “By and large, the law says nothing to initial decisionmakers who
wonder what standard of proof they should apply to propositions of
law.  Fact finders are always given a standard; law finders are generally
on their own.”123  They just have to find the law (or make conclusions
of law)—doing so by a process that goes largely unexamined, appar-
ently because the process comprises a usually internal and fairly intui-
tive or automatized chain of cognition.  Nevertheless, even if
unexamined, standards of proof for law are in play.124  Moreover, ex-
amining them illuminates the matter of standards of proof in general.
The standard of proof for law normally is more-likely-than-not.125
But this standard of proof does not apply to the whole question of
what the applicable law is, because an approach requiring the entire
law in dispute to be more-likely-than-not would lead to disastrous gaps
where no law exists, as when multiple plausible interpretations com-
pete.126  Instead, the key insight, unperceived in the previous litera-
ture, is that this standard of proof applies at, and only at, each binary
crossroad the judge encounters in determining what the law is.  That
is, if a judge adopts the more likely interpretation at each of a series of
122 Id. at 875.
123 Id. at 888.
124 Burdens of proof for law are consequently in play too, even if we tend not to speak
of them either. See id. at 868, 895.  Often, it is obvious which party is pushing an issue of
law and so bears the burden of persuasion.  Yet, burdens on law can shift under the influ-
ence of canons of interpretation. See id. at 877.  The judge thereby will come at any inter-
pretative problem from one direction while going toward a particular view, and so should
put the risk of nonpersuasion on the party urging that view.
125 The focus here is initial decision making, not appellate review. See id. at 883–88.
Moreover, the focus is law determining, not law making. See Richard D. Friedman, Stan-
dards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 935–38
(1992).
In initial law determining, standards of proof should be generally applicable for whole
categories of cases.  In an ideal world, even for law determining, one could argue that the
standard of proof should vary case by case in response to the expected value of each possi-
ble legal interpretation. See id. at 926–27; cf. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, Deter-
rence Versus Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 161 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 193 (2005) (making a similar point with respect to fact finding, and
showing by sophisticated analysis that a variable standard of proof, set on a case-by-case
basis by the ideal judge, could serve accuracy by offsetting the unavailability or inadmissibil-
ity of evidence in the particular case).  But the path of the law in the real world has not
been toward variable standards of proof. See Friedman, supra, at 936–37.
126 See Larry Alexander, Proving the Law: Not Proven, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 905, 905–11
(1992). But cf. Lawson, supra note 108, at 894–904 (embracing the disastrous result). R
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properly ordered yes-or-no steps, the judge will reach an overall inter-
pretation of the law at issue that is more likely correct than any com-
peting interpretation.127  This step-by-step more-likely-than-not
standard, then, will produce the most acceptable of the alternative
interpretations, which is, as most observers agree, what the system
should and does desire to reach.128
Sometimes, the standard of proof differs from the normal and
neutral one of more-likely-than-not, in order to avoid the special costs
of error in one particular direction.  The most prominent example is
where a clear-statement rule, such as the rule of lenity in criminal law,
raises the bar for finding a change in the law.129  When a clear-state-
ment rule prevails, the evidence must unmistakably compel the inter-
pretation being urged.  For one specific example, finding a statutory
exception to full faith and credit requires an “affirmative showing” of
a “clear and manifest” congressional purpose.130
Getting back to the subject of jurisdictional issues of law that
overlap the merits, the standard of proof should lower in order to
minimize costs.  Admittedly, some cases do seem weakly to suggest
that a court must determine all jurisdictional issues of law in the nor-
mally full fashion.131  This position must be wrong. The court should
avoid treating an attack on personal jurisdiction like a demurrer.132
127 In fact finding, analogously, the standard of proof applies in theory to each ele-
ment of a claim or defense, not to the whole story. See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN
& KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1272–74 (8th
ed. 2003) (discussing the problem of conjunction); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black
Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 559–69 (2004)
(discussing whether standards of proof are in reality applied atomistically or holistically).
And likewise, this step-by-step approach will yield the most plausible story, not necessarily a
story that is more probable than not. See Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persua-
sion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 936–43.
128 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 126, at 906, 911. But cf. Lawson, supra note 108, at R
890–94 (resisting the best-available-alternative approach, which he concedes is generally
accepted).
129 See Lawson, supra note 108, at 888–90.  Presumptions used in legal interpretation, R
such as the presumption of territoriality used within the realm of legislative jurisdiction,
can play a similar role. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248–49 (1991),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1074.
130 Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982).
131 See, e.g., Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 545–47 (8th Cir. 1998) (ruling that be-
cause inmate failed to present prima facie evidence showing that his claims were within the
scope of the Missouri long-arm statute, there was no personal jurisdiction over defendants,
but also determining that his causes of action were not legally sound).
132 See Petters v. Petters, 560 So. 2d 722, 724 (Miss. 1990) (“It is easy to see that Rule
12(b)(2) (personal jurisdiction) and Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) inquiries are
separate and distinct.  A non-resident’s amenability to suit here in no way turns on the
viability of the claim the plaintiff asserts.  Conversely, that the plaintiff’s claim is without
merit is never sufficient to establish lack of personal jurisdiction.  The non-resident does
not prevail on his Rule 12(b)(2) motion by convincing the court that the plaintiff’s suit is
groundless.”) (citations omitted).
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The threshold legal decision should not fix the law applicable on the
merits in this or any future case; instead, the decision should deter-
mine only whether personal jurisdiction exists.  At each step of the
legal analysis on jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be able to survive by
making some sort of plausible showing that might not measure up to
more-likely-than-not.  That is, the plaintiff should have to make only a
plausible showing of a favorable outcome on the particular legal issue
or, in other words, only a prima facie showing on the law that overlaps
the merits.133
Once again, the prima facie approach avoids the problems of the
full-proof approach.  It is true that the latter approach for jurisdic-
tional issues of law does not pose judge/jury problems, and perhaps
raises the res judicata and other problems in less intense form than
for jurisdictional facts.  But for jurisdictional issues of law that overlap
the merits, the full-proof approach would open default judgments to
subsequent attack for failure to state a claim, which would usually be
unacceptable.
B. Extending Beyond Personal Jurisdiction to All Forum-
Authority Requirements
1. Territorial Jurisdiction, Service and Notice, and Venue
So far the discussion has focused on personal jurisdiction.  Yet
the same considerations apply to nonpersonal jurisdiction of either
the in rem or the quasi in rem variety.134  If nonpersonal jurisdiction
and the merits overlap as to an issue, then a lower standard should
apply to that jurisdictional issue.135  The reason for any seeming new-
ness of this observation is not only that nonpersonal jurisdiction is
133 See Zeunert v. Quail Ridge P’ship, 430 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“When
a defendant challenges jurisdiction, a court will make a preliminary inquiry as to whether
the complaint states a legitimate cause of action ‘to insure that acts or omissions which
form the basis of a cause of action that is patently without merit will not serve to confer
jurisdiction.’” (quoting Wiedemann v. Cunard Line Ltd., 380 N.E.2d 932, 938 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978))); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68, 83
(N.Y. 1965) (Van Voorhis, J., concurring) (“I think that, without prejudice to the determi-
nation of questions of liability at the trial, enough has been shown to indicate the existence
of a substantial controversy which if resolved in plaintiff’s favor on the facts and the law,
would warrant the assumption of jurisdiction under [the long-arm statute]. . . . Since prod-
ucts or some related form of liability (if established) would mean that the infant plaintiff’s
injuries arose out of the particular business transaction engaged in by the nonresident
manufacturer in the purposeful circulation of this hammer in the stream of commerce in
New York State, enough has been shown prima facie to warrant upholding jurisdiction to
try this issue.”).
134 See 2 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, § 6-3. R
135 See Fla., Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d 1340, 1345–46 (5th Cir.
1980) (applying a lower standard to ownership in the unusual situation where deciding
who owns the thing determines whether in rem jurisdiction exists), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 458 U.S. 670 (1982).
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relatively uncommon but also that here overlap is a rare situation.  For
example, the location of the res usually does not overlap with the mer-
its of the underlying claims to the res, meaning that the normal pre-
ponderance standard would usually apply to a jurisdictional challenge
in the initial action or on subsequent attack.136
The same considerations apply as well as to service and notice,137
and even to venue.138  Thus, for the usual issues involved in applying
these threshold requirements, the plaintiff needs to make a showing
of more-likely-than-not.  But in the relatively rare cases for which these
threshold issues overlap the merits, a prima facie standard should
come to apply.
For a service and notice example of overlap, the plaintiffs in an
automobile accident case served the nonresident defendants under
the state’s nonresident motorist statute on the basis that the other
driver was allegedly the defendants’ employee.139  That employment
issue, which incidentally reveals the often close relation of service to
personal jurisdiction, was common to proper service and to the mer-
its.  In reversing a dismissal for improper service, the Tenth Circuit
observed:
Turning now to appellants’ contentions, Rule 12(d) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure clearly contemplates a preliminary
hearing and determination of jurisdictional issues in advance of
trial unless the court defers such action until the time of trial.  Fur-
thermore, as there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an
issue of jurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left to the trial
court.  Certainly the trial court may gather evidence on the question
136 See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 116 (1963) (holding that after active litiga-
tion of a quiet-title action, a determination by a Nebraska state court of the issue of juris-
diction over the land, resting on a questionable finding by a preponderance that the land
on the banks of the shifting river was in Nebraska rather than Missouri, precluded a later
attack by the defendant).  Although the Supreme Court referred to the issue in Durfee as
one of “jurisdiction over the subject matter,” id. at 108, its characterization was sloppy.  The
issue there was conceptually one of quasi in rem jurisdiction over particular land, not one
of general competence to hear quiet-title suits.  Moreover, the policies at stake were those
of territorial jurisdiction, not those of subject-matter jurisdiction. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 10, 11 cmt. b, 12 (1982) (explaining territorial jurisdic-
tion and subject-matter jurisdiction).
137 See 2 CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 3, §§ 6-1[4], 6-2[1][b]; 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, R
supra note 12, § 1353, at 345 (noting the situation when “factual issues [are] intertwined R
with the merits of the case” involving service and notice).
138 See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 47, § 12.32[4]; 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, R
§ 1352, at 324; cf. Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“The standard that we announce today also comports with the approach we have taken
with other FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) motions.  That the result is similar is not surprising based
on our view of the practical realities that may often underlie Rule 12(b) motions: These
motions are typically made early in litigation when the factual record is undeveloped and
granting a Rule 12(b) motion will terminate the case in the selected forum.”) (citations
omitted).
139 Schramm v. Oakes, 352 F.2d 143, 145 (10th Cir. 1965).
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of jurisdiction by affidavits or otherwise in an effort to determine
the facts as they exist, and based upon the evidence so obtained,
decide the jurisdictional dispute before trial.  One deviation from
this procedure is in the case where the issue of jurisdiction is depen-
dent upon a decision on the merits.  In that circumstance, the trial
court should determine jurisdiction by proceeding to a decision on
the merits. The purpose of postponing a determination upon a ju-
risdictional question when it is tied to the actual merits of the case is
to prevent a summary decision on the merits without the ordinary
incidents of a trial including the right to jury. . . .
. . . .
While this is not meant to be an exhaustive review of the facts
which might subject appellees to service of process, it does clearly
show that the possibilities exist.  At least this is the type of case
where appellants should have the opportunity of proving jurisdic-
tion during the trial on the merits and not be cut off at a prelimi-
nary hearing.140
Thus, this case presented the same kind of problem that this Article
has been addressing.  The outcome is correct, even though the rea-
soning could have been clearer; the court could have recognized that,
for service purposes, a prima facie standard applied to employment
throughout the proceedings.
For a venue example, the Eleventh Circuit in an antitrust case
held that “the plaintiff must present only a prima facie showing of
venue.”141  The venue issue was whether the claim arose in the North-
ern District of Georgia.142  Although the evidence was in conflict, the
plaintiff’s evidence showed that the defendants participated in a seem-
ingly conspiratorial meeting there and that the injury seemingly oc-
curred there.143  That showing sufficed for the court to reverse a
dismissal for improper venue.144
2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Even for the unique doctrine of subject-matter jurisdiction, with
all its weighty concerns, the same considerations appear still to con-
trol.  Thus, the proponent must prove issues by a showing of more-
likely-than-not.145  A prime example would be the citizenship of par-
140 Id. at 149–50 (citations omitted).
141 Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir.
1988).
142 See id. at 855.
143 See id. at 856.
144 See id.
145 See Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995); 5B WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 12, § 1350, at 180–210. R
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ties in a diversity action.146  But when the jurisdictional issues overlap
the merits, a prima facie standard prevails.147  A prime example of the
latter situation might be a Federal Tort Claims Act148 case in which
the overlapping issue is whether the negligent sailor was “acting
within the scope of his office or employment.”149
One might argue that, in order to avoid prematurely forcing the
court to delve too deeply into the merits, jurisdiction must be kept so
completely separate from the merits that, albeit with some artificiality,
any particular fact would go either to jurisdiction or to the merits.150
The motivation for such an argument derives largely from a fear that
jurisdiction must always be proved to a high standard of proof.  But
the argument ignores the possibility of adjusting downward the stan-
dard of proof when jurisdiction and the merits overlap, a possibility
that the Supreme Court has blessed:
The argument, of course, assumes that the truth of jurisdictional
allegations must always be determined with finality at the threshold
of litigation, but that assumption is erroneous.  Normal practice
permits a party to establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case by
means of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements, and
any litigation of a contested subject-matter jurisdictional fact issue
occurs in comparatively summary procedure before a judge alone
(as distinct from litigation of the same fact issue as an element of
the cause of action, if the claim survives the jurisdictional
objection).151
It is true that problems of subject-matter jurisdiction are not
often discussed in terms of standard of proof, but those terms have a
powerfully clarifying effect on some familiar doctrines of subject-mat-
146 See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 699–700
(2005).
147 See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 (1947) (“[A]lthough as a general rule the
District Court would have [full] authority to consider questions of jurisdiction on the basis
of affidavits as well as pleadings, this is the type of case where the question of jurisdiction is
dependent on decision of the merits.”) (footnote omitted); Augustine v. United States, 704
F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Because the jurisdictional issue is dependent upon the
resolution of factual issues going to the merits, it was incumbent upon the district court to
apply summary judgment standards in deciding whether to grant or deny the govern-
ment’s motion.  That is, it was improper for the district court to grant the government’s
motion unless the relevant facts were not in dispute and the government was entitled to
prevail as a matter of law.”).
148 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (2000).
149 Montez v. Dep’t of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 2004) (“However, where issues
of fact are central both to subject matter jurisdiction and the claim on the merits, we have
held that the trial court must assume jurisdiction and proceed to the merits.”).
150 See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 146, at 693, 701 (noting that the federal court R
should resolve jurisdiction first, “before even peeking at the factual specifics of the plain-
tiff’s federal cause of action”).
151 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 537–38
(1995) (discussing admiralty jurisdiction) (citations omitted).
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ter jurisdiction and on some of its new problems as well.  The follow-
ing five major examples will suffice to make this point, but it is worth
noting that the same approach to standard of proof applies more
broadly across all of subject-matter jurisdiction.152
a. Jurisdictional Amount
Consider first the most prominent example, which just below its
surface entails a standard of proof.  On inquiry into jurisdictional
amount, usually without discussion, the preponderance standard ap-
plies in the absence of other considerations.153  But as usual, the court
in deciding jurisdiction must avoid trying the merits.  The standard
therefore must be lowered to prima facie proof for issues that overlap
the merits.154  Indeed, such overlap is a very common occurrence
here, because most of the jurisdictional amount inquiry involves
weighing the claim’s worth.
Thus, the well-known legal-certainty test155 is actually a prima fa-
cie standard of proof.  To satisfy the jurisdictional amount require-
ment in a diversity case where the plaintiff has pleaded a claim for
more than $75,000 against the defendant, the plaintiff needs to be
able only to show a legal possibility that the judgment could exceed
152 See, e.g., infra notes 170 (fraudulent joinder), 176 (Alien Tort Statute analogies) & R
199 (Title VII analogies).  The prima facie approach may indeed apply beyond all these
forum-authority requirements. See, e.g., infra notes 176 (legislative jurisdiction) & 190 R
(class action certification).  But that extension would take us beyond the scope of this
Article.  See supra text accompanying note 58 (dividing all issues between forum authority R
and the merits).
153 See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)
(holding in an injunction suit that amount in controversy was the loss that would result
from enforcement of challenged regulation, and observing: “The authority which the stat-
ute vests in the court to enforce the limitations of its jurisdiction precludes the idea that
jurisdiction may be maintained by mere averment or that the party asserting jurisdiction
may be relieved of his burden by any formal procedure.  If his allegations of jurisdictional
facts are challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by
competent proof.  And where they are not so challenged the court may still insist that the
jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed, and for that purpose the court
may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a preponderance
of evidence.”).
154 See Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 645 (1907) (“lest, under the guise of determin-
ing jurisdiction, the merits of the controversy between the parties be summarily decided
without the ordinary incidents of a trial”); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886)
(finding the lower court erred in ruling that there could be no lawful recovery of amount
at least equal to the required amount in controversy, and erred in concluding that if a
verdict in such amount were awarded, such verdict would be set aside for being excessive).
155 See Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) (“It
must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount to justify dismissal.”); 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3702 (3d ed. 1998); cf. 14C id. § 3725 (dis-
cussing the differing standards of proof in the removal setting).
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$75,000 under the applicable law.156  Plaintiffs can pass this test very
easily, especially in unliquidated tort cases, because jurisdiction will
exist even though a recovery over $75,000 is on the facts highly un-
likely.157  That is, because the jurisdictional amount and the merits
overlap, courts ask for no more than a very modest factual showing to
establish jurisdiction.158  In order to rebut legal certainty, the plaintiff
need establish only a legal possibility or, in other words, establish that
a reasonable fact finder could award more than the jurisdictional
amount.  In sum, the legal-certainty test, as applied to the damages
that might be recovered, is in essence a required factual showing of a
reasonable possibility of exceeding the floor amount.159
Some courts will at an early stage dismiss occasional cases in
which requested damages are very flagrantly exaggerated, but all tests
routinely more rigorous than the reasonably possible standard have
proved impractical.160  For example, a few courts, through some vague
verbal formula, try to raise the bar, in effect by nudging the standard
of proof up to a substantial possibility.161  But while courts are fairly
adept at applying the reasonably possible standard, as they do on mo-
tion to dismiss or for summary judgment without full discovery and
evidentiary hearing, courts would find curtailing the opponent’s pro-
cedural opportunities for factual development to be more questiona-
ble as the standard elevates to substantial possibility or above.
156 See Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1996) (dic-
tum) (“[A]pplication of the ‘converse legal certainty’ test in these circumstances would
force the federal court to exercise jurisdiction even if there was only a legal possibility that
the amount in controversy exceeded [the statutorily required amount].”).
157 See Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 285 (3rd Cir. 1959) (finding in a tort case that
the claimed damages passed the legal-certainty test, and observing: “The necessary choice,
except in the flagrant case, where the jurisdictional issue cannot be decided without the
ruling constituting at the same time a ruling on the merits, is to permit the cause to pro-
ceed to trial.  Even then, unless the court were convinced that the plaintiff was never enti-
tled to the jurisdictional amount, and his claim was therefore asserted only for the purpose
of gaining jurisdiction, dismissal on jurisdictional grounds would not be justified.”) (cita-
tions omitted).
158 See id. (observing that “since the issue of jurisdictional amount in this case is so
closely tied to the merits of the cause, insistence upon evidence with respect thereto must
be limited”).
159 See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 253 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir.
1958) (“Where the jurisdictional issue as to amount in controversy can not be decided
without the ruling constituting at the same time a ruling on the merit of the case, the case
should be heard and determined on its merits through regular trial procedure.”); Stefania
A. Di Trolio, Comment, Undermining and Unintwining: The Right to a Jury Trial and Rule
12(b)(1), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1247, 1264 n.142, 1280 n.234 (2003) (discussing cases
where the jurisdictional issues are intertwined with the merits).
160 See 14B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 155, § 3707. R
161 See, e.g., Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971) (seeming to require, by its
analogies to the new-trial test that equates the jury’s clear error to its having decided in the
absence of a substantial possibility, a showing of a substantial possibility of exceeding the
jurisdictional minimum); see also Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three, supra note 1, R
at 1126–28 (discussing the different standards of review).
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Moreover, an elevated standard would more often necessitate jurisdic-
tional dismissals during or after trial, when the facts get better devel-
oped.  These difficulties are unacceptable, and therefore the workable
legal-certainty test prevails.  But the ongoing debate is so much more
comprehensible if framed in terms of the standard of proof.
Moving beyond issues of fact in applying the legal-certainty test,
courts should also require only a prima facie showing on issues of law
that overlap the merits.  It is already clear that the plaintiff need not
survive the usual demurrer test for the legal sufficiency of the claim,
or show the absence of valid defenses, in order to establish that liabil-
ity exists sufficiently for jurisdictional purposes and that the judgment
could therefore legally exceed the jurisdictional amount.162  Similarly,
the plaintiff need not establish by a more-likely-than-not standard the
measure of damages under the applicable law; for example, even if
the availability of punitive damages remains unclear, a big enough
claim for them will nevertheless support jurisdiction.163
As courts move toward considering exclusive-remedy or limita-
tion-of-liability provisions in the course of applying the legal-certainty
test, however, they show more confusion.164  For example, one court,
in recently granting a Rule 12(b)(1) motion based on lack of the juris-
dictional amount, engaged in a full-fledged consideration of the appli-
cability and enforceability of a contractual ceiling on damages.165  The
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument “that the liquidated damages
provision does not apply because: (1) [the plaintiff] is seeking direct
damages and this provision does not limit its recovery of direct dam-
ages; (2) it is unenforceable due to [the defendant’s] willful and/or
bad faith breach of the contract; and (3) it is unenforceable because it
is contrary to the public policy embodied in the Kansas Salesperson
Commission Statutes.”166  To do so, the court was perfectly willing to
resolve “questions of law and disputed jurisdictional facts” on “a juris-
162 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab
Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
163 See Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Grengs, 257 F.2d 45, 47 (7th Cir. 1958) (upholding
jurisdiction because plaintiffs’ alleged actual and punitive damages exceeded the statutory
requirement); see also Calhoun v. Ky.-W. Va. Gas Co., 166 F.2d 530, 531 (6th Cir. 1948)
(upholding jurisdiction despite “very real controversy in respect to the applicable law of
Kentucky” on damages); Duhon v. Conoco, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 1216, 1222 (W.D. La. 1996)
(upholding jurisdiction “where it is unclear as to whether state law precludes recovery”).
164 See, e.g., Stuart v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001)
(allowing, on jurisdictional attack, full legal testing of whether workers’ compensation was
exclusive remedy); cf. Radil v. Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1225–26 (10th Cir.
2004) (applying lowered standard of proof to factual dispute on exclusivity of workers’
compensation).
165 LDCircuit, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1263 (D. Kan.
2005) (refusing also to count damages for tortious interference claim that was “patently
without merit”).
166 Id. at 1251.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\91-5\CRN501.txt unknown Seq: 39  7-JUN-06 11:44
2006] JURISDICTIONAL FACT 1011
dictional issue that was logically distinct from whether the defendant
breached its contractual duties.”167
Other courts manage to avoid this confusion.  They have recog-
nized the undesirability of getting into the merits on a jurisdictional
motion.  In particular, the Second Circuit has refused to go that route,
although it has rested its refusal on the shaky reason that the limita-
tion-of-liability provision is an affirmative defense and thus off-limits
altogether on jurisdiction, even as to jurisdictional amount.168
The better approach—which incidentally is in the nature of a
compromise between these two lines of precedent—would be to re-
quire, on overlapping fact or law, only a prima facie showing to estab-
lish jurisdictional amount, with the case then moving on to the
merits.169
b. Substantiality Rule
The same approach of a prima facie standard of proof helps ex-
plain the so-called substantiality rule, under which the basis of a fed-
eral-question claim must be substantial—that is, sufficiently
meritorious.170  This restriction requires little to avoid dismissal on ju-
167 Id. at 1254.
168 See, e.g., Zacharia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 1982) (re-
jecting relevance to amount in controversy of arguably applicable statutory cap on dam-
ages); cf. Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States, 347 F.3d 394,
398–99 (2d Cir. 2003) (disallowing use of res judicata, an affirmative defense, to whittle
down the amount in controversy).
169 See Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. P’ship v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d 350, 362–63 (7th
Cir. 1995) (Flaum, J., dissenting) (“But where the plaintiff has presented more than a
colorable issue regarding the amount in controversy, courts should accept that presenta-
tion and move on. Otherwise, we are encouraging too much jurisdictional maneuvering at
the outset of litigation.”).
170 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1946) (finding a weak claim to be neverthe-
less substantial enough); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 108 (1933)
(granting dismissal in an injunction case because the claim set forth in the pleading was
not substantial).
The principal manifestation of the fraudulent joinder doctrine, which facilitates re-
moval of diversity cases, traditionally took the form of a converse of the substantiality rule.
See generally 14 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 155, § 3641, at 169–89 (discussing
treatment of various fraudulent joinder scenarios); 14B id. § 3723, at 576–80, 625–58
(describing the historical development of the fraudulent joinder doctrine and its policy
underpinnings).  That is, to invoke it, the defendant would show that the claim involving
the party impeding removal was factually or legally frivolous and was pretextual: the defen-
dant had the burden of showing that its position on the merits was strong enough to re-
move reasonable doubt, and also that the plaintiff had the equivalent of an intent to
deceive. See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 185–86 (1907)
(upholding removal because one of the defendants was wrongfully joined for the sole pur-
pose of defeating the defendants’ right to remove the case).  But some lower courts of late,
in addition to imposing other restraints on devices to destroy federal jurisdiction, have
expanded the fraudulent joinder doctrine: they seem to be moving toward putting the
burden on even the innocent plaintiff to make a showing sufficient to survive a supported
motion for summary judgment, with a nonfrivolous showing on the facts and a full showing
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risdictional grounds: it means that the federal element must not be
factually immaterial, in the sense of being without substance and
tacked on only to get into federal court; it also means that the federal
claim cannot be legally frivolous, in the sense of being laughably weak
and asserted to establish federal jurisdiction.  In this traditional for-
mulation, the plaintiff’s motive in employing a federalized formula-
tion of the claim seemingly plays a role, but in reality no court would
sustain an immaterial or frivolous claim asserted with innocent mo-
tive, or dismiss a material and nonfrivolous claim asserted merely to
get into federal court.171  In sum, under the inaptly named substanti-
ality rule, the party invoking federal jurisdiction need show no more
than the claim’s factual and legal viability to a reasonable possibility,
not even having to show a substantial possibility of success.
Of course, even a “substantial” claim, after it has survived this le-
nient threshold jurisdictional test that requires only a prima facie
showing, may very well fail on the merits:
[I]f the plaintiff raises a substantial federal question, the court
has jurisdiction of the case and its decision must go to the merits of
the case.  Jurisdiction is not lost because the court ultimately con-
cludes that the federal claim is without merit.  The complaint still
may be dismissed on motion but the dismissal then is one for failure
to state a claim on which relief can be granted rather than dismissal
for want of jurisdiction.172
Perhaps, however, this example of the substantiality rule appears to
disprove the analogy of subject-matter to personal jurisdiction.  After
all, the reason for the substantiality restriction lies in keeping the
plaintiff from using an insubstantial claim to get a foot in the federal
courthouse door, a foot that would allow the plaintiff to inject supple-
mental state claims into the federal court.  This raison d’eˆtre might
therefore suggest that subject-matter jurisdiction really is different
from personal jurisdiction for these purposes.  Yet, a determination
that personal jurisdiction exists likewise can open the door to supple-
on the law. See, e.g., Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 923–24 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (uphold-
ing removal because the real controversy was between plaintiff baseball player and defen-
dant baseball commissioner, rather than with the other defendants); E. Farish Percy,
Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court Based on Fraudulent Joinder, 91
IOWA L. REV. 189 (2005).  This expansion has come without statutory authorization and
appears to be undesirable. See generally Matthew J. Richardson, Clarifying and Limiting
Fraudulent Joinder, 58 FLA. L. REV. 119 (2006); James F. Archibald III, Note, Reintroducing
“Fraud” to the Doctrine of Fraudulent Joinder, 78 VA. L. REV. 1377 (1992).  The undesirability
only grows in this era of increasingly abusive removal. See generally Theodore Eisenberg &
Trevor W. Morrison, Overlooked in the Tort Reform Debate: The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551 (2005).
171 See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–43 (1974) (omitting reference to motive
when determining whether a federal court has jurisdiction over a claim).
172 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3564, at 73–74 (2d ed. 1984).
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mental service.173  More pertinently, to the extent that special consid-
erations linked to subject-matter jurisdiction are present, the court
can account for them in setting the appropriate level of the required
prima facie showing.174  Thus, the substantiality rule remains a good
example of a lowered standard of proof on a jurisdictional issue that
overlaps the merits.  The court avoids deciding the merits in the guise
of determining jurisdiction, and the reasonably possible standard suf-
fices to protect from abuse of supplemental jurisdiction.
c. Alien Tort Statute
So this simple approach to standard of proof applies broadly.
Nevertheless, life is inescapably complicated.  Thus, a hierarchy of ju-
risdictional issues exists for subject-matter jurisdiction, just as it does
for personal jurisdiction.175  Courts have not been explicit in specify-
ing their choice among the possible meanings of prima facie proof in
each context of subject-matter jurisdiction.  But one can see the hier-
archy by comparing the substantiality rule to the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS).176
This ancient statute bestows jurisdiction for federal common law
tort actions, which are drawn with great judicial restraint from inter-
national law.177  Under the ATS, a foreigner can sue a foreigner for a
173 See supra text accompanying note 40.
174 See infra Part II.B.2.c.
175 See supra Part I.B.4.
176 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”); cf. Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172–73
(5th Cir. 1994) (discussing Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co.,
588 F. Supp. 1513, 1519–20 (D.D.C. 1984) (drawing analogy to other special federal juris-
dictional statutes that impose a heightened standard on one or more jurisdictional issues
that overlap the merits).
A similar example comes from the realm of legislative jurisdiction, which lies close to
subject-matter jurisdiction.  In order for federal subject-matter jurisdiction to exist in, say,
an extraterritorial antitrust case, it is virtually necessary for the legislature to have pre-
scribed a cause of action for this plaintiff.  Thus, in this extraterritorial setting and on this
particular point of legal sufficiency, the standards for subject-matter and legislative jurisdic-
tion are nearly equivalent. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795–96
(1993); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 749 F.2d 1378,
1383 (9th Cir. 1984); cf. “In” Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 499
n.5 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (stating that allegations on factual issues that overlap between juris-
diction and merits are to be accepted for jurisdictional purposes).  The result for such
extraterritorial jurisdiction, just as for ATS jurisdiction, is that the court should give rather
searching scrutiny to legal sufficiency, although not to factual issues that overlap the
merits.
177 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712, 724 (2004); William S. Dodge, Bridg-
ing Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87, 88 (2004) (stating that Sosa “reaffirmed that ‘the domestic
law of the United States recognizes the law of nations’ and characterized customary inter-
national law as ‘federal common law’ for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute”); Ralph G.
Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of
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tort occurring abroad.178  But if the ATS required only that the cause
of action be not legally frivolous, the federal courthouse doors would
be open too wide to related claims under state or foreign law.  The
alien plaintiff could simply allege a violation of the law of nations sup-
posedly incorporated in the federal common law, taking refuge in this
legal area’s being confused enough that virtually no cause of action is
laughably weak, and then pursue relief much more surely available
under law other than federal common law.  And so the United States’
courts would indeed become the forum for the world’s human-rights
litigations.
Consequently, the federal courts have beefed up the required le-
gal showing of a tort in violation of the law of nations:
The paucity of suits successfully maintained under the section is
readily attributable to the statute’s requirement of alleging a “viola-
tion of the law of nations” (emphasis supplied) at the jurisdictional
threshold.  Courts have, accordingly, engaged in a more searching
preliminary review of the merits than is required, for example,
under the more flexible “arising under” formulation. Compare
O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1907) (question of
Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction disposed of “on the merits”)
(Holmes, J.), with Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (general fed-
eral question jurisdiction not defeated by the possibility that the
averments in the complaint may fail to state a cause of action).
Thus, the narrowing construction that the Alien Tort Statute has
previously received reflects the fact that earlier cases did not involve
such well-established, universally recognized norms of international
law that are here at issue.179
Thus, to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must go be-
yond showing that the claim is substantial and establish that it is le-
gally viable.180
International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2245 (2004)
(asserting that courts must be careful to avoid “an expansive reading of the statute” and
must “determine which human rights claims ‘rest on the norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world’”).
178 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
179 Fila´rtiga v. Pen˜a-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887–88 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. id. at 889 n.25 (not-
ing that any later decision to apply foreign law would not oust jurisdiction: “Such a deci-
sion would not retroactively oust the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction, even
though plaintiff’s cause of action would no longer properly be ‘created’ by a law of the
United States.  See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916) (Holmes, J.).  Once federal jurisdiction is established by a colorable claim under
federal law at a preliminary stage of the proceeding, subsequent dismissal of that claim
(here, the claim under the general international proscription of torture) does not deprive
the court of jurisdiction previously established.”).
180 This heightened standard of decision is close to, or the same as, the more-likely-
than-not standard that applies under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). See Kadic v. Karadzˇic´, 70
F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Thus, it is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to plead
merely a colorable violation of the law of nations.  There is no federal subject-matter juris-
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In contrast to legal issues overlapping the merits of an ATS case,
this heightened standard does not apply to jurisdictional facts overlap-
ping the merits.181  Thus, there is a hierarchy of jurisdictional issues,
within which “prima facie” conveys different meanings.
d. Class Action Fairness Act
The proposed approach so puts the familiar rules of legal-cer-
tainty and substantiality in a revealing light, while also helping to read
a very old and troublesome statute.  It can illuminate new problems,
too.  An example comes in examining how the controversial Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) might work.182
One of CAFA’s purposes was to get state class actions into federal
court, where federal judges would supposedly take a more disciplined
approach to class certification.183  Thus, the statute provides for re-
moval to federal court of certain cases filed as class actions in state
court.184
What happens if, after removal, the federal judge does indeed
deny class certification: does the case stay in federal court, or does
that court dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction?185  I think that the
denial of certification will not oust jurisdiction, because the court
reached a determination that the case was a class action for jurisdic-
diction under the Alien Tort Act unless the complaint adequately pleads a violation of the
law of nations (or treaty of the United States).”).  Incidentally, the same heightened stan-
dard on the law applies to the other part of the ATS that treats claims of violation of a
treaty. See Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
181 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto plc, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1130–31 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
182 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005); see Georgene M. Vairo, Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005: With Commentary and Analysis by Georgene M. Vairo of the Moore’s Federal Practice Board
of Editors (Loyola Law Sch. (Los Angeles) Legal Studies, Paper No. 2005-22, 2005), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=806405; Anna Andreeva, Student Article, Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005: The Eight-Year Saga Is Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385 (2005).
183 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14, 22 (2005) (referring, in a report issued after enact-
ment, to “the ‘I never met a class action I didn’t like’ approach to class certification” in
some state courts); Rick Knight, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: A Perspective, FED. LAW.,
June 2005, at 46 (analyzing and evaluating the Act); Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Ac-
tions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1521, 1522–23 (2005) (discussing law makers’ actual motivations).
184 Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(a), 119 Stat. 4, 12 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C § 1453); see
Adam N. Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs’ Ears, and Congressional Expansions of Federal Juris-
diction: Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and Its Lessons for the Class Action Fairness Act, 81 WASH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=802764.
185 The same problem can arise in a case brought as a class action originally in federal
court. See Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(2), 119 Stat. 4, 9 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C
§ 1332(d)); David F. Herr & Michael C. McCarthy, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005—
Congress Again Wades into Complex Litigation Management Issues, 228 F.R.D. 673, 679 (2005)
(noting the problem).  Indeed, the problem is then cleaner, because there can be no hid-
ing behind a notion that class action status under state law is a different issue from class
action status under federal law.  In both removal and original jurisdiction, the burden of
proof should be on the proponent of federal jurisdiction. See Georgene M. Vairo, Is CAFA
Working?, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 14, 2005, at 12.
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tional purposes under a different and lower standard of proof than
the determination that the case was not a class action for certification
purposes; accordingly, the removed but uncertified case will stay in
the federal court as an individual action until someone ushers it out,
as by a voluntary dismissal.186  And if the plaintiff refiles the case as a
class action in state court, it is again subject to removal to federal
court, where preclusion will presumably apply to both jurisdiction and
certification issues.187  The bottom line, which is consonant with the
drafters’ purposes, is that an action within the statute’s coverage that
previously could have gone forward in state court as a class action will
no longer proceed as a class action, even in state court, unless it meets
federal certification requirements.
Nevertheless, this removal problem has bedeviled the listserve for
civil procedure professors.  Some found it illogical to apply a different
meaning of “class action” for jurisdiction and for certification:
[There is] the idea that under CAFA a civil action can be class
action for purposes of jurisdiction, but not be a class action for pur-
poses of certification. . . . But accepting the possibility, then a civil
action can, under federal law, be a class action and not be a class
action at the same time.  On contemplating this possibility, it oc-
curred to me that the authors of the CAFA must have been deeply
into Zen.  Perhaps the whole point of CAFA is to break the back of
logic, leading us to a higher state of procedural awareness that will
arise only upon deep meditation of this nonsense.188
The logical fog dissipates upon expressing the different meanings
in terms of the required showings.  For jurisdiction, the court might
demand merely a good-faith allegation of a class action.189  For certifi-
186 Previous versions of the bill had provided a basis for dismissal, but the enacted
version omits that provision without explanation.  For example, the 2003 CAFA bill pro-
vided, in relevant part:
(7)(A) A district court shall dismiss any civil action that is subject to the
jurisdiction of the court solely under this subsection if the court determines
the action may not proceed as a class action based on a failure to satisfy the
prerequisites of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall prohibit plaintiffs from filing
an amended class action in Federal court or filing an action in State court,
except that any such action filed in State court may be removed to the
appropriate district court if it is an action of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction.
S. 274, 108th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (2003) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 31,
2003).
187 See CLERMONT, supra note 4, § 4.4(B) (discussing the res judicata effects of a juris- R
dictional determination); cf. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333
F.3d 763, 767–69 (7th Cir.) (taking a broad view of preclusion by class-certification deci-
sion), on remand, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
188 Posting of Allan Ides, Professor, Loyola Law School, to Civil Procedure Listserve,
civpro@law.wisc.edu (Feb. 26, 2005) (on file with author) (quoted with permission).
189 See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 44 (2005) (suggesting a limited factual inquiry on other
CAFA jurisdictional issues); 151 CONG. REC. H729 (2005) (same).
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cation, the plaintiff usually must show by a preponderance that the
case satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.190  Then, there is no difficulty in saying that the suit is
sufficiently a class action to support removal, but not certifiable so as
to proceed to judgment as a class action.
e. Title VII
The definitive word on the standard of proof for jurisdiction
could have come this year in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.191  In that case, a
female former bartender/waitress brought a federal action under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a New Orleans restau-
rant, the Moonlight Cafe´, alleging sexual harassment by one of its
owners.192  The jury awarded the plaintiff $40,000.193  Then, after
judgment, the defendant sought for the first time to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the restaurant did not satisfy
Title VII’s definition of an employer as “a person engaged in an indus-
try affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees.”194  After
additional discovery, the district court dismissed, explaining that the
Moonlight Cafe´ lacked the requisite number of employees because
the calculation should be exclusive of the restaurant’s delivery drivers
and its owners.195  The court of appeals affirmed.196  The Supreme
Court unanimously—and correctly—reversed.197
Should the defendant be able so late in the case to render the
proceedings for naught by suddenly raising subject-matter jurisdic-
tion?  Yes.  Should the court as part of the jurisdictional determina-
tion decide under a preponderance standard this fact-intensive issue
of a sufficient number of employees?  No.  But the Supreme Court
reached that result on the narrow ground that the particular statutory
requirement was not jurisdictional at all, because Congress had not
“clearly state[d] that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall
190 See L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Comment, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analy-
sis”: Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1041, 1048–51 (2004); cf. Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24,
36–37 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (mentioning the possibility of overlap of certification issues with
merits and hence the need to avoid foreclosing the merits).
191 546 U.S. ____, 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006).  The question presented was this: “Section
701(b) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applies the Title VII prohibition against
employment discrimination to employers with fifteen or more employees. Does this provi-
sion limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, or does it only raise an issue
going to the merits of a Title VII claim?”  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *i, Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. ____, 125 S. Ct. 2246 (2005) (No. 04-944), 2005 WL 83275.
192 See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at ____, 126 S. Ct. at 1240.
193 See id. at 1241.
194 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000); see 546 U.S. at ____, 126 S. Ct. at 1240.
195 See 546 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1241.
196 See id.
197 See id. at 1245.
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count as jurisdictional.”198  The Court left untouched the broader
question of how to handle an issue that does seem to overlap jurisdic-
tion and merits.
Howard Wasserman has written impressively and exhaustively on
this broader question.199  His solution is always to separate completely
issues of subject-matter jurisdiction from those on the merits: if an
issue is jurisdictional, the proponent must prove it by a preponder-
ance; if it instead is on the merits, the proponent need not prove it at
all as a matter of jurisdiction, either at the threshold or later.200  He
views jurisdiction and merits as distinct exercises of different powers,
with the former resting on the structural powers of Congress to specify
the federal courts’ jurisdiction over classes of cases and with the latter
resting on the constitutional powers to create causes of action for re-
lief.201  He draws the dividing line so that any issue that the federal
plaintiff would have to establish in order to prevail on an identical
action in state court is an issue on the merits, and so is not
jurisdictional.202
Although I agree that Professor Wasserman’s “categorical ap-
proach” gives the correct answer in the Arbaugh case, I disagree with
his approach as a general solution.  It has three principal failings.
First, the categories of subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits are in
reality not exclusive sets of issues, but instead can overlap.203  The sim-
ple proof is that Congress could have expressly provided in Title VII
both that jurisdiction requires more than fifteen employees and that
the plaintiff must establish more than fifteen employees to prevail on
the merits.204  Therefore, the system must provide for treating issues
198 Id.
199 See Wasserman, supra note 146.  Besides discrimination statutes modeled on Title
VII, his prime examples of potentially overlapping jurisdiction and merits are “the require-
ment of an agreement in restraint of trade affecting commerce under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act and the requirement of action under color of state law in constitutional claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 645–46 (footnotes omitted).
200 See id. at 693, 701.
201 See id. at 673–78, 691–92.
202 See id. at 702.  A very similar solution was proposed by Di Trolio, supra note 159, at
1280–81, but that comment-writer’s concern was exclusively with the risk of infringing on
the jury right. See id. at 1247–48, 1272–73.
203 See Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1614
(2003) (arguing that jurisdiction is not inherently different from the merits and that “the
line between jurisdictional issues and merits issues is always at some level arbitrary”).
204 See Wasserman, supra note 146, at 692 (seeming to concede this point). More au-
thoritatively, the Arbaugh Court recognized this truth. See 546 U.S. at ____, 126 S. Ct. at
1245 (“Of course, Congress could make the employee-numerosity requirement ‘jurisdic-
tional,’ just as it has made an amount-in-controversy threshold an ingredient of subject-
matter jurisdiction in delineating diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332.”). Arbaugh’s clear-statement rule will reduce the incidence of overlap, but will
mainly affect peripheral statutory issues.  Indeed, the Court listed numerous examples
where subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits still do overlap. Id. at 1245 n.11.
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that fall into both areas.  Second, some jurisdictional provisions not
only could be written in merits terms but also must be, because consti-
tutional provisions on the judicial power often speak not merely of
classes of cases but of classes of cases based on a certain type of
claim.205  Determining, for example, whether a claim arises under fed-
eral law requires a glance at the scope of federal law, in order to keep
federal courts from unconstitutionally exercising universal jurisdiction
upon pro forma allegations.206  Therefore, some inquiry into the mer-
its is unavoidably part of many jurisdictional determinations.  Third,
moving all issues on the merits completely out of the realm of jurisdic-
tion would open the door wide to abuse of supplemental jurisdic-
tion.207  If the merits were irrelevant to jurisdiction, a totally meritless
federal claim could support federal jurisdiction for related state
claims.208  Therefore, an additional and related reason exists to make
some inquiry into the merits a part of many jurisdictional
determinations.
Accordingly, I think it better to side with those judges who have
recognized that certain issues common to subject-matter jurisdiction
and the merits may exist and that these issues require special han-
dling.209  The proponent on these issues need make no more than a
prima facie showing for jurisdictional purposes.  Proof by a prepon-
derance and testing by demurrer would await adjudication on the
merits.
Under this general approach, even if Congress had made the
number of employees jurisdictional, Jenifer Arbaugh would ultimately
have retained her verdict.  She could have made a prima facie show-
ing that the restaurant had a sufficient number of employees for juris-
dictional purposes, because that showing would have involved at most
205 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (reaching claim-based realms as well as party-based
realms).
206 See Wasserman, supra note 146, at 693–94 (seeming to concede this point); cf. supra
note 176 (treating legislative jurisdiction).
207 See supra text accompanying notes 170–72.  Likewise, the judge would become una-
ble to invoke FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) in order to raise the issues sua sponte.
208 See Di Trolio, supra note 159, at 1279–80 (recognizing need for substantiality rule).
But see Wasserman, supra note 146, at 701 n.284 (disapproving of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946)).
209 See Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 929–30 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that
status as employer “implicated both jurisdiction and the underlying merits of Appellant’s
FMLA claim,” and so jurisdiction exists if plaintiff produces prima facie proof, which here
means sufficient evidence to survive a supported motion for summary judgment); Trainor
v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding in an ADA
case that jurisdiction and merits are intertwined when the same statute grants subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction and provides the substantive claim); Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs.,
M.D.’s, 104 F.3d 1256, 1266 (11th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the question of whether defen-
dant “is an ‘employer’ under ADEA provides the basis for both subject matter jurisdiction
and the substantive claim for relief,” and so jurisdiction exists if plaintiff has raised a genu-
ine issue).
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a showing of reasonable possibility, that is, a showing sufficient to raise
a genuine issue on the facts and to establish nonfrivolity on the law.
Given jurisdiction, it was too late, after judgment, for the Moonlight
Cafe´ to raise on the merits whether there really were fifteen employ-
ees in fact and in law.
CONCLUSION
From a morass of confused cases on a procedural point of signifi-
cance, there emerges a startlingly clear rule that covers jurisdictional
fact, and much more.  On any factual element or legal question of
forum authority, from subject-matter jurisdiction to venue whenever
properly challenged, the proponent of forum authority must make
the usual showing of more-likely-than-not, subject to this exception: if
that element or question overlaps the merits of the claim, the propo-
nent need provide only prima facie proof to establish the forum’s au-
thority.  Depending on the particular threshold issue’s importance,
“prima facie” might mean any of the standards below the more-likely-
than-not standard, namely, slightest possibility, reasonable possibility,
substantial possibility, or equipoise.  That lower standard will allow the
judge to decide efficiently but definitively whether the forum has au-
thority to decide the merits—doing so without entailing or foreclosing
any decision on the merits, a decision to which a higher standard
would apply.
